Writing for a Real World 2009-2010: A multidisciplinary anthology by USF students

              WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
Writing
for a
Real World
2009 - 2010
A multidisciplinary anthology by USF students
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO
DEPARTMENT OF RHETORIC AND LANGUAGE
2
www.usfca.edu/wrw
Writing for a Real World (WRW) is published annually by the
Department of Rhetoric and Language,
College of Arts and Sciences, University of San Francisco.
WRW is governed by the Rhetoric and Language Publication
Committee, chaired by Devon C. Holmes and David Holler.
Members are: Brian Komei Dempster, Michelle LaVigne,
Michael Rozendal, and David Ryan.
Writing for a Real World: 8th edition © 2010
The opinions stated herein are those of the authors.
Authors retain copyright for their individual work.
Essays include bibliographical references. The format and practice
of documenting sources are determined by each writer. Writers are
responsible for validating and citing their research.
Cover image courtesy of Rich Cleland.
This photograph was taken in Stone Town, Zanzibar in Tanzania.
Printer: DeHarts Printing, San Jose, Calif.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
To get involved as a referee, serve on the publication committee, obtain
back print issues, or to learn about submitting to WRW, please contact
David Holler <dholler@usfca.edu>. Back issues are now available
online via Gleeson Library’s Digital Collections. For all other inquiries:
Writing for a Real World, University of San Francisco, Kalmanovitz Hall,
Rm. 202, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA, 94117.
Fair Use Statement: Writing for a Real World is an educational
journal whose mission is to showcase the best undergraduate writing
at the University of San Francisco. Student work often contextualizes
and recontextualizes the work of others within the scope of course-related
assignments. WRW presents these articles with the specifi c
objective of advancing an understanding of academic knowledge,
scholarship, and research. We believe that this context constitutes a
“fair use” of copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107,
the material herein is made available by WRW without profi t to those
students and faculty who are interested in receiving this information
for research, scholarship, and educational purposes.
3
Writing for a Real World
2009 - 2010
Editor
David Ryan
Managing Editor and Cover Designer
David Holler
Associate Editors
Brian Komei Dempster
Devon Christina Holmes
Darrell g.h. Schramm
Publication Assistants
Estephanie Bautista Sunga
Laura Waldron
Program Assistant
Tara Donohoe
Journal Referees
Karen Bouwer, Modern and Classical Languages
Brian Komei Dempster, Rhetoric and Language
Leslie Dennen, Rhetoric and Language
Brenda Frye, Physics and Astronomy
Joe Garity, Gleeson Library
Johnnie Johnson Hafernik, ESL, Rhetoric and Language
David Holler, Rhetoric and Language
Devon C. Holmes, Rhetoric and Language
Leslie King, Biology
Todd Lewis, Rhetoric and Language
Michelle LaVigne, Rhetoric and Language
Theodore Matula, Rhetoric and Language
Mark Meritt, Rhetoric and Language
Michael Rozendal, Rhetoric and Language
Stephanie Vandrick, ESL, Rhetoric and Language
Fredel Wiant, Rhetoric and Language
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
4
Reading and Writing in the Disciplines 6
Dedication to Darrell g.h. Schramm 9
Honorable Mentions 10
The Petrine Confession as the Origin of Christology:
A Structural and Theological Re-examination of
Matthew 16: 13-20
JOEY BELLEZA 12
The Right to Discriminate: An Analysis of
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
MADISON RUSSELL 33
Confl ict and Compromise: The Constitutionality
of Slavery
BRENNA MCCALLICK 45
The Story of Cormac mac Airt
KELSEY RANSICK 56
Projecting Institutionalized Racism
HANNAH HEYER 73
Prevalence and Barriers to Treatment and Social Impact
of Untreated Diabetes Mellitus in Guatemala
RICHARD P. HACKETT 90
Aging Alice
JULIA PENDER 101
Not All Who Wonder Are Lost
KYLE O’BRIEN 110
Table of Contents
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
5
Remittances: A Refl ection of and an Impetus
for Shifting Somali Gender Relations
HEATHER M. FOX 119
The Decision to End It All
NELENE DEGUZMAN 133
2010-2011 Submissions Information 144
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
6
Reading and Writing in the Disciplines
STUDENT WRITING is often composed in uncertainty. Though
students understand their teachers are an exclusive audience,
they also know that this audience is demanding, and, often, unpre-dictable
when assessing their work.
Writing occurs in the curricular work of our university to help
students develop their rhetorical knowledge and their research
skills. For this reason, most academic writing serves academic
interests. However, considerable eff ort is put into writing about
public issues, workplace matters, technical and business interests,
and service-learning. In these varying contexts, students use writ-ing
to process their learning as well as resolve problems. In these
ever broadening spheres, students are asked to creatively and sen-sitively
adapt their composing choices and research methods to
situations in which even greater uncertainty exists.
These shifting variables are often met with other epistemo-logical
challenges when teachers give their students the freedom
to choose the focus of their assignments. For some students, this
latitude is a paralyzing excess, but, for resourceful writers, this
freedom allows them to employ their imagination, interpretation,
ethics, and reasoning to better meet the challenges of writing in
more uncertain or ill-defi ned spheres of learning.
For our eighth edition, our student writers use their consider-able
skill and rhetorical knowledge to compose their work from
six diff erent disciplines. From English, history, nursing, politics,
theology and religious studies, and rhetoric, our authors use writ-ing
to address a variety of subjects, including the historiography
of Cormac mac Airt, the literature of Charles Dodgson (Lewis
Carroll), the debate regarding the constitutionality of slavery,
institutionalized racism, First Amendment rights, Golden Gate
Bridge suicide barriers, and regional and global health issues. We
hope our readers enjoy these essays, for our mature writers enter
uncomfortable spheres of uncertainty as a way to create certain
knowledge.
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
7
Notes
No one knows for certain just how many papers were written last
year at USF. Although an untold number of papers were composed,
students submitted 126 entries for this issue, and every entry was
reviewed carefully by at least two readers, and every winning sub-mission
had to pass the review of at least four referees. In our an-thology,
we present 10 exemplary papers in manuscript form writ-ten
from the 2009–2010 academic year. We thank our new as well
as experienced judges for reviewing the submissions with great
care and patience. Our judges are listed on page three.
Fr. Urban Grassi, S.J. Award
In this issue, the Department of Rhetoric and Language announces
its fourth annual Fr. Urban Grassi, S.J. Award for Eloquentia Perfecta,
an award named after USF’s fi rst professor of English and Elocu-tion.
This award is given to the highest recommended entry. This
year’s winner is Joey Belleza for his essay, “The Petrine Confes-sion
as the Origin of Christology: A Structural and Theological Re-
Examination of Mt. 16: 13-20,” written for Professor Vincent Piz-zuto.
Congratulations, Joey, for this remarkable accomplishment.
Acknowledgements and Gratitude
With this edition, our gratitude extends to include a growing
number of supporters. We are deeply grateful to Provost Jennifer
Turpin, who has enthusiastically supported this project from its
inception nine years ago. This anthology benefi ts from the collec-tive
administrative support of Peter Novak, Vice Provost, Student
Development; Marcelo Camperi, Interim Dean of the College of
Arts and Sciences; and Lois Lorentzen, Associate Dean of Arts and
Humanities, College of Arts and Sciences.
This year we off er incalculable thanks to Digital Collections Li-
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
8
brarian Zheng Lu at Gleeson Library, who oversaw the arduous task
of digitizing and making available all previous issues of Writing for a
Real World; this digital archive will be immensely helpful in making
our annual publication easily accessible to all students at all times.
The web address is listed on the last page of this journal.
Many thanks go to the instructors of our authors for composing
their introductions during their summer break. Brian Komei
Dempster, David Holler, Devon C. Holmes, and Darrell g.h.
Schramm all provided a much needed push toward publication. As
the following page indicates, we dedicate this eighth issue of WRW
to our valued retiring colleague, Associate Professor Darrell g.h.
Schramm, who served in innumerable capacities during his twenty
years at USF—not least of which was his devotion to his writing
students. This publication also ends the tenure of Devon C. Holmes
as our publication commitee chair, a position now chaired by David
Holler. David and I give our deepest thanks to Devon for her years
of leadership and continued commitment to our journal’s success.
Our program assistant, Tara Donohoe, and our publication
assistants, Estephanie Bautista Sunga and Laura Waldron, deserve
special praise for helping WRW meet its many deadlines. Thanks,
too, to Norma Washington and John Pinelli for managing the ledger,
and, of course, a large debt, as well, is owed to Fredel Wiant, Chair
of our newly formed Department of Rhetoric and Language, for
her governance.
Finally, our deepest gratitude is reserved for those students who
submitted their work. As our Honorable Mention list illustrates
on page ten, we received many more commendable papers than we
were able to publish. Congratulations to those who earned honor-able
mention, and, of course, congratulations to our winners, for all
of our newest authors bravely enter the realm of published writers
writing for a real world.
—David Ryan, Editor
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
9
This issue of
Writing for a Real World
is dedicated to
Darrell g.h. Schramm,
teacher, writer, poet
10
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
Honorable Mentions
HEATHER M. FOX
“Injecting Meaningful Revisions into
Oregon’s Non-medical Vaccination Exemption Policy”
written for Public Ethics
Brian Weiner, Politics
BRENNA MCCALLICK
“Casting Down the Gods from Their Pedestals:
Burlesque in Nineteenth Century America”
written for History of American Popular Culture
Candice Harrison, History
JOEY BELLEZA
“On a Hierarchy of Ends in Ecumenical Dialogue:
A Longerganian–Ratzingerian Analysis of Ecumenism”
written for Introduction to Longergan
Mark Miller, Theology and Religious Studies
HANNAH HEYER
“Satirically Verbose”
written for Written Communication II
Brian Dempster, Rhetoric and Language
SOFIA ANDRADE
“The Adverse Eff ects of the
North American Free Trade Agreement in Mexico”
written for U.S. Foreign Policy
Stephen Zunes, Politics
KELSEY O’BRIEN
“Examining Time in Virginia Woolf and Friedrich Nietzsche”
written for Existentialism
Amy Timko, Philosophy
WRITING FOR A REAL WORLD
11
NICOLE RILEY
“In Need of Protection: A Look at Special Victims in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo”
written for Rhetoric and Politics
David Holler, Rhetoric and Language
ASHLEY RIESER
“The Error in Assuming a Defi nite Character”
written for Written & Oral Communication
Devon Holmes, Rhetoric and Language
ANDREA POWELL
“The Uptown Tenderloin:
Not Quite the Tourist Hotspot of Your Dreams”
written for Written & Oral Communication
Devon Holmes, Rhetoric and Language
CHRISTOPHER J.S. WALDREF
“Storing the Harvest: Solutions for Renewable Energy Storage”
written for Written & Oral Communication
David Holler, Rhetoric and Language
ADAM DOUGLAS JACKSON ROSS
“ ‘Put Some Sauce on It and We Call It Art’:
A Dynamic Examination of the Usage of the
‘N’ Word Among Ethnicities”
written for Written Communication II
Tom Lugo, Rhetoric and Language
DANIEL O’CONNELL
“Welcome to the Tea Party”
written for Advanced Writing Practicum
Darrell g.h. Schramm, Saint Ignatius Institute
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
12
WRITER’S COMMENTS
The Petrine roots of the papal offi ce are a frequent topic of discussion
among Christian theologians, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. In the
modern context, debates surrounding the papacy are critical in devel-oping
new refl ections on ecclesiology and the progress of ecumenism.
This essay is but a simple contribution to the lively exchange of ideas
which frequently surrounds this biblical passage. Returning to the
Semitic roots of Matthew’s “rock narrative” (Mt. 16:13-20), I propose a
new understanding of the person of Peter which, consonant with the
traditional doctrines of the Catholic faith, attempts to more clearly de-fi
ne the paramount signifi cance assigned to the “prince of the apostles”
by the nascent Jewish-Christian community in the fi rst generation of
the post-Apostolic era. By referring to the recurrence of strong Old
Testament motifs in Matthew, we conclude that Peter necessarily held
an undeniable primacy among the apostles, a primacy that also stood
undisputed by the members of the fl edgling Christian religion.
—Joey Belleza
INSTRUCTOR’S COMMENTS
Every graduating senior who is majoring in Theology and Religious
Studies at USF is required to submit a capstone thesis paper. The
course for which Joey Belleza wrote his paper was entitled, “Portraits
of Christ: An Introduction to the Gospels.” This course introduces
students to the historical-critical methods of biblical interpretation,
which seek to examine the history of the Bible itself, and our ability
to accurately interpret biblical texts in light of that history. With a
focus on the four gospels, the course examines the way in which each
evangelist—Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John—presented their christol-ogy
in a manner that could best be understood and appropriated by
their audience. Thus, the gospels present us with four different literary
“portraits” of Christ, each of which vary depending on the perspec-tive
of the evangelist, yet are also recognizable as portraits of the same
“Jesus.” Joey’s capstone assignment was to choose one passage or
“pericope” from among the four gospels and elucidate that passage by
offering a careful exegesis of the text in light of the overall christology
of the evangelist. In other words, Joey’s paper examines one “brush
stroke” of the gospel writer’s “portrait” of Christ.
—Rev. Vincent Pizzuto, Department of Theology and Religious Studies
JOEY BELLEZA
13
JOEY BELLEZA
The Petrine Confession as the Origin
of Christology: A Structural and Theological
Re-examination of Matthew 16:13–20
When Jesus went into the region of Caesarea Philippi he asked
his disciples, “Who do people say that the Son of Man is?” They
replied, “Some say John the Baptist, others Elijah, still others
Jeremiah or one of the prophets.” He said to them, “But who
do you say that I am?” Simon Peter said in reply, “You are the
Messiah, the Son of the living God.” Jesus said to him in reply,
“Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah. For fl esh and blood has
not revealed this to you, but my heavenly Father. And so I say
to you, you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church,
and the gates of the netherworld shall not prevail against it. I
will give you the keys to the kingdom of heaven. Whatever you
bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatever you loose
on earth shall be loosed in heaven.” Then he strictly ordered his
disciples to tell no one that he was the Messiah.1
Ἐλθὼν δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς τὰ μέρη Καισαρείας τῆς Φιλίππου ἠρώτα
τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ λέγων, Τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τὸν
υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; οἱ δὲ εἶπαν, Οἱ μὲν Ἰωάννην τὸν βαπτιστήν,
ἄλλοι δὲ Ἠλίαν, ἕτεροι δὲ Ἰερεμίαν ἢ ἕνα τῶν προφητῶν. λέγει
αὐτοῖς, Ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνα με λέγετε εἶναι; ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ Σίμων Πέτρος
εἶπεν, Σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος. ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ
Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Μακάριος εἶ, Σίμων Βαριωνᾶ, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα
οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι ἀλλ’ ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν ��οῖς οὐρανοῖς. κἀγὼ δέ
σοι λέγω ὅτι σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου
τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ πύλαι ἅδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς. δώσω σοι
τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς
ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ ὃ ἐὰν λύσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται
λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. τότε διεστείλατο τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἵνα
μηδενὶ εἴπωσιν ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός.
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
14
Introduction
OF ALL THE APOLOGETIC WORKS written in defense of the insti-tutional
papacy, almost all without exception make recourse
to this pericope from the Gospel of Matthew. As such, it is oft-cited
as a singular proof text justifying the existence of the papal
ministry, the dogma of Roman primacy, and the concept of Petrine
succession. That these words are boldly and prominently embla-zoned
around the cupola of St. Peter’s Basilica in the Vatican lends
signifi cant weight to such a broad interpretation of the text. Yet
one should be wary of such a superfi cial and misguided approach,
since the text in question does not concern the topics of Roman
primacy, of succession, or even of papal ministry (in its developed
modern form). The apologist must turn to other sources written
during the sub-apostolic age, both biblical and patristic, to develop
stronger support for these doctrines. The passage herein discussed,
therefore, is by itself insuffi cient “proof” to justify the entirety of
present ecclesiastical structures.
What can be determined with measurable certainty from this
pericope, however, is the fi rst and necessary step in constructing a
theological-exegetical apologia pro primatio pontifi cis romani: by this
“fi rst step” we mean the concept of Petrine (as opposed to Roman)
primacy. The passage clearly indicates a special status held by Simon,
son of John (or Jonah) among the followers of Jesus. By analyzing
the text of the pericope itself, its proximate context within Mat-thew,
and its remote context in light of other scriptural texts, we
can develop novel understanding which, in terms consonant with
the Matthean theological hermeneutic, further elucidates the nature
of Peter’s unique signifi cance for the nascent Christian community.
Jesus as Messiah of the Jews: A Primer of Matthean Theology
Written after the Neronian persecutions and the destruction of the
Temple in Jerusalem (circa 75–85 AD), this Greek gospel accord-ingly
displays a doctrinal design diff erent from that of its canonical
predecessor, Mark. Marcan infl uence is still prevalent, however, in
JOEY BELLEZA
15
that much of the stories recounted in Matthew are taken from
Mark. At times the parallel stories display remarkably high lexical
and structural similarity, indicating that Matthew simply copied
Mark’s account and used it for his own chronicles. In the instances
where Matthean stories do not correspond exactly to its Marcan
counterpart (such as the focus of our present investigation), we
fi nd that the redactions as a whole, coupled with stories taken
from the postulated proto-Matthew or “M” source, demonstrate
Matthew’s theological priority.
What is this Evangelist’s priority? Let us fi rst examine the Sitz
im Leben of the contemporary period. The diaspora generated by
the pacifi cation of Palestine by the Romans sent Jews out of Jeru-salem
and into new metropolitan centers of the Empire. The per-secutions
of Nero similarly produced like eff ects in the case of the
Christians. In cities such as Antioch in Syria, followers of the Way
frequently crossed paths with those holding fast to the rabbinic and
Mosaic traditions, forcing the Christians (a term fi rst coined in An-tioch;
cf. Acts 11:26 NAB) to develop a systematic defense of their
beliefs against the inquiries of the Jews. Where seams in narrative
sections are discerned, the inserted texts often take an apologetic
character, going at length to rebut specifi c Jewish objections to the
new faith in Jesus (cf. Mt 28:11-15). In locating the place where the
First Gospel was written, Antioch therefore seems to be a prime
candidate; for the purpose of our investigation, we shall retain this
assumption.
Why Antioch? There are several reasons. One of the major
themes running throughout the Gospel of Matthew (and a cen-tral
concern of our pericope) is the importance placed on Simon
Peter. Although each canonical gospel recognizes that Simon son
of John (or Jonah) was given the name “Peter” by Jesus, the “Rock
dialogue,” which indicates a special authority given only to Peter,
is a redactive text unique to Matthew. Antioch was home to a par-ticularly
strong Petrine tradition, which names Evodius as Peter’s
successor as head of the local church. The authentic letters of Ig-natius,
who succeeded after Evodius’ death, further demonstrate
substantial knowledge of the Gospel of Matthew.
But perhaps the best evidence for choosing Antioch is specifi -
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
16
cally the socio-religious situation therein. As a major metropolis
with a substantial Jewish population (implied by Acts 11:19), the au-thor
of Acts felt compelled to also mention that certain Christians
there also “began to speak to the Greeks, proclaiming the Lord
Jesus” (Acts 11:20), supporting the assumption that those who min-istered
to the Gentiles were Jewish–Christians. With the preva-lence
of Judaism fi rmly established in Antioch, we can discern
Matthew’s intent to make clear to non-Palestinian Jews that the
expected Messiah had fi nally arrived. This contrasts with Mark’s
approach who, writing to an earlier audience with more chrono-logical
proximity to the Paschal events, found no need to explain
ad nauseam the Jewish character of Jesus’ messianic offi ce.
In light of this richly nuanced Sitz im Leben, Matthew’s apparent
fondness of explicit Old Testament citation and Moses–Christ par-allelism
acquires defi nitive clarifi cation. That the apostles are com-manded
not to preach outside Israel until after the Resurrection
(cf. Mt 10:5-6, see also 15:24) highlights Matthew’s own concern for
his primarily Jewish audience. The gospel’s fi ve book structure, the
genealogy narrative, and the Sermon on the Mount, among other
things, all point to the Matthean idea that Christ is a greater Moses,
heir to the Davidic throne, establishing a new covenant in the Lord.
For Matthew, Jesus’ story is prefi gured in the Law and prophets; he
is the fulfi llment of the Law and the prophets and the concrete real-ization
of God’s everlasting presence among men. That this theme
unifi es the Gospel is eloquently demonstrated by Matthew’s famous
inclusio. The birth narrative tells of a fulfi llment of Isaiah’s prophecy:
“‘Behold, a virgin shall be with child and bear a son, and they shall
name him Emmanuel,’ which means, ‘God is with us’” (1:23). The
decisive arrival of the prophesized Messiah is solemnly proclaimed
by the risen Christ himself; after commissioning the disciples to
evangelize to the ends of the earth, the last words of this gospel are:
“And behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age” (28:20).
With the historical context of Matthew’s authorship having
been established, let us discuss a major thematic element which will
assist our understanding of Mt 16:13-20. Comprehension of the Jew-ish–
Christian ontology of God (which runs throughout the gospel text)
has direct implications for the exegetical analysis of our pericope.
JOEY BELLEZA
17
The Shema and the Ontology of God in Matthew
Matthew’s Jewish–Christian audience would have been doubtless-ly
familiar with the shema, the supreme Jewish profession of faith
(Dt 6:4):
It is a declaration of utmost solemnity, of highest importance
for the Jews and the synthesis of all their religious beliefs. It ex-presses
the essential truth of Judaism, which is the oneness and
uniqueness of God (the Hebrew word echad meaning “one,”also
means “alone,” in the sense that the Lord alone is God). The struc-ture
of the shema is of particular interest to us, since it constitutes
a triple formula which we will see repeated in the Gospel of Mat-thew.
There is a vocative appeal which calls the addressed person or
people by name or title; other two phrases expound on the meaning
of the fi rst clause. In the case of the shema, the fi rst clause is a call
to Israel, an act of communication on the part of God. The call
of God communicates the truth of monotheism to the People of
Israel, as expounded in the second and third clauses. This is the
essential ontological statement of divine identity which is of uni-versal
signifi cance for Jews; now we shall see how Matthew adopts
the triple structure of shema for his fi rst-century Jewish–Christian
audience to explain the ontology of Christ, who is new self-com-munication
of God to the world.
A consistent feature in all the gospels, Jesus rarely speaks of
his divine nature in clear terms outside of the circle of his apos-tles,
hence the so-called “Messianic secret”; when in the presence
of crowds or when pressed by his rabbinic and Roman adversaries,
Jesus opts either to speak in parabolic language or to refuse to speak
at all. Yet in the rare occasions within Matthew where the Divin-ity
directly speaks of its own nature in unambiguous terms, we can
glimpse traces of the triple ontological structure of the shema.
One of the key ontological statements in Matthew is found
shema Yisrael
adonai [yhwh] elohenu
adonai [yhwh] echad
Hear, O Israel,
The Lord our God:
The Lord is One.
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
18
in 4:17, after Jesus emerges from John’s baptismal waters. The
voice of God, coming forth from the sky, says, “This is my be-loved
Son, with whom I am well pleased.” In this case, the tri-ple
structure appears unfi nished, and yet this “incompleteness”
is understandable, since the baptism in the Jordan only signifi es
the beginning of Jesus’ ministry. Still, the manifestation of the
Trinity in the baptismal scene prefi gures the completion of the
triple structure, which arises again towards the end of Jesus’
ministry in the transfi guration narrative (17:1-8). Here the voice
of God speaks the same words (to Peter, John, and James bar
Zebedee) as during the baptism, with a decisive addition of a
third phrase: “This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well-pleased;
listen to him.” This augmentation brings completion
to the precise formulation of God’s nature. He exists not as a
wholly aloof fi gure trapped in the Platonic world of forms; he
is the transcendent initiator of a reciprocal communication be-tween
the human and divine. He is the same one God of Israel,
who calls his people by name and admonishes his people to
listen, to hear—shema! Lagrange adds this commentary on the
transfi guration which will foreshadow our deeper investigation
into Peter’s confession: “peut-être il-faut regarder la voix à la trans-fi
guration comme un confi rmation par le Pére, adressée aussi a Jacques
et Jean, de ce qu’avait dit Pierre. Ou bien on pourrait, comme nous
le proposions alors, placer la confession après la Transfi guration dans
l’ordre du temps.”2 The baptism and transfi guration are therefore
intimately linked as stages in the progressive revelation of God
in the person of Christ; taken together, the two presuppose
the confession of Peter between them as an intermediate but
necessary step.
Another central ontological statement exists in Matthew’s
inclusio which we have already discussed. The end of the gos-pel
includes Christ’s emphatic statement: “I am with you always
(ἐγὼ μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας),” which defi nitively
articulates the unity of Father and Son. Furthermore, we cannot
take this verse out of the context of the Great Commission and
the command to baptize in the name of the Lord, who is Father,
Son, and Spirit (28:16-20). This commission therefore recalls the
baptism of Christ, where the mystery of the Trinity was fi rst re-
JOEY BELLEZA
19
vealed; in light of all that has been previously discussed, the entire
Christian conception of God can be said to have its prefi guration in
the shema, its transfi guration during the appearance of Moses and
Elijah, and its completion in the commission to baptize.
Within this cycle of shema—baptism—transfi guration—com-mission
(which is the cycle of salvation history) lies our pericope.
It will now be our task to show that the solemn declarations within
16:13-20 belong to this class of triple-structured ontological state-ments
concerning the nature of God which have the ancient Jew-ish
profession of faith as its archetype and origin. We can advance
now to the direct analysis of 16:13-20. In this exploration it shall be
paramount to recall Matthew’s intended audience and the ontol-ogy
of God presented here.
Exegesis: Verses 13-14
That Matthew puts this story in “the region of Caesarea Philip-pi”
immediately indicates a Marcan origin, since the parallel story
(Mk 8:27-30) also places the Petrine confession in the same loca-tion.
The question posed by Jesus to his disciples is ontological in
nature; given Matthew’s demonstrated interest in the ontology of
God, we sense the extraordinary weight of the issue. This is not
a question of Mosaic Law; rather, the inquiry points at the very
heart of Jesus’ identity. To emphasize the magnitude of the inqui-ry,
Pierre Bonnard writes that the verb ἠρώτα, here translated as
“asked,” “peut revetir les deux signifi cations de demander (quelque chose a
quelqu’un) et d’interroger; [Matthieu] ne le connaît le second sens.”3 What
Jesus reveals in the following verses therefore must have an unusu-ally
high signifi cance.
The phrasing of the question reveals a Matthean redaction:
whereas Mark’s Jesus asks, “Who do people say that I am,” our
pericope asks, “Who do people say that the Son of Man is?” If we as-sume
that Matthew copied from Mark, we can conclude that Mat-thew
already equates Jesus (the “I am” of Mark) with the “Son of
Man,” indicative of the mindset of Syrian Christians who already
profess Jesus as Messiah of the Jews.
Verse 14 gives the response of the apostles. Jesus’ question
“was answered by all the apostles in unison, like a chorus.”4 The
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
20
response comes from no single person, but is the product of con-sensus
anonymously verbalized by a faceless they—“They replied...”
The identity of those giving the reply is as ambiguous as the con-tent
of the reply itself: “Some say John the Baptist, others Elijah,
still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets” (16:14). The fact that
the disciples are able to answer Jesus’ fi rst question in a collegial
manner indicate that these (misguided) conceptions of the Son of
Man were indeed common at the time and that the disciples knew
these claims and perhaps believed them. We can even perceive a
rapidity of response on the part of them, perhaps highlighting even
more the presence of confusion within the circle of disciples con-cerning
Jesus’ identity. As Peter is introduced, we see how Mat-thew
creates a dichotomy between this uncertainty of the disciples
and the confi dent audacity of Peter.
Verse 15
Jesus asks a second question, moving away from the vagueness of
what other people think of him and towards greater specifi city.
Pressing deeper into the interrogation, the new inquiry is directed
to his disciples. When Jesus asks, “Who do you [Ὑμεῖς, plural] say
that I am,” we fi nd that the verb εἶναι is not preceded by pronoun
ἐγώ: the inquiry deliberately lacks the emphatic “I am,” for saying
so would be revelatory and would defeat the purpose of interro-gation.
It is as if Jesus consciously refrains from giving any more
clues as to his identity; by placing the burden of ontological inves-tigation
on them, he expects a dramatic leap of faith away from
the ambiguity of “what people say” and onto the fi rm certainty
of orthodoxy, of right belief. It is precisely in this shift from the
confusion of many voices to the certainty of one voice that Simon
Peter enters the picture.
Verses 16-18
We approach the core of our investigation. Peter confesses Jesus’
identity, but in a manner more comprehensive and complex than in
the Marcan account. Whereas Mark simply puts the words “You are
JOEY BELLEZA
21
the Messiah” in Peter’s mouth (Mk 8:29), Matthew presents the Pe-trine
confession as a solemn, lengthy declaration. The redaction is a
symptom of the pre-existing Petrine tradition in Antioch. Matthew
is the fi rst canonical gospel defi nitively written after the apostle’s
execution, and therefore his eminence was amplifi ed after receiving
“the crown of martyrdom.” For Matthew, the confession here must
prefi gure the confessio martyrorum he would ultimately endure in
Rome, though as we see in Mt 16:21-23 (immediately following our
pericope), Peter does not yet fully comprehend the implications of
the confession.
Commonly rendered in English Bibles (including our NAB) as
“You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God,” these translations
fail to convey the actual tripartite structure of the Greek text, and
as occurs often, a loss in translation produces a loss in clarity. The
verse is best transliterated in the following manner:
Leiva–Merikakis renders this as “the Messiah, the Son of the
God, the living one,”saying that “the four defi nite articles strung to-gether
like this mean to convey the uniqueness and singularity of all
the members [parts] of in sentence, quite in line with the radical em-phasis
of the shema on the Oneness of God.”5 Note that the fi rst line
of the confession, Σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς, retains the emphatic pronoun;
Peter’s statement is therefore one of radical, cosmic importance.
In response to Peter’s affi rmation of the Christ, Jesus says to
this, apostle “Μακάριος εἶ,” which means “blessed/happy are you
[singular]”—Jesus addresses Peter alone. In labeling him “blessed,”
we can also sense the profound elation and happiness felt by Jesus
upon hearing Peter’s solemn proclamation of faith. The confession
of Peter generates a special blessing on his person; he is blessed
because of his confession.
“Flesh and blood” is a term with a particular meaning. In the
Semitic worldview, blood is the essence and sign of life; it was
Σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς
ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ
τοῦ ζῶντος
You are the Christ
the Son of God,
[of] the Living one
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
22
painted on doorposts to avert the angel of death, spilled on altars
as an oblation to the divinity, and sprinkled on the masses as a sign
of regeneration and renewal (Ex 12:7, 24:6-8; Lv 6:15). Flesh, the
physical matter of bodies, is nothing but a product of dust (Gs 2:7;
3:19), and is meaningless without fl owing (living) blood. Human life
is impossible unless fl esh and blood are fused together, as it were,
into one being; “fl esh and blood” therefore signifi es the fullness of
human existence. Indeed, it is all human life.
As we saw in verses 13-15, Matthew introduces a dichotomy be-tween
the uncertainty of a group and the certainty of one voice
and by speaking with this certainty, Peter receives an extraordinary
blessing. The truth which he professes is so great that even the
fullness of all human ability and its multiplicity of voices—all fl esh
and blood—cannot adequately perceive or communicate this truth
on its own. Rather, Peter’s one voice conveys a truth made known
through the revelation of the Father, the voice of the one God.
This declaration of unshakable certainty compels Jesus to give
unto Simon, son of Jonah, a new name: Peter, which means “rock.”
Countless pages have been written, often by Protestant objectors
to the papal offi ce, which asserts that the name bestowed upon Si-mon,
Πέτρος, cannot be directly equated with “this rock” (πέτρᾳ)
upon which Jesus builds his church, basing this claim on a subtle
diff erence in meaning between the two words which existed in
ancient Attic Greek but was lost in the emergence of the Koine
[Biblical] dialect. In any case, the deliberate wordplay would make
no sense unless Peter was indeed the Rock; furthermore, assuming
that this conversation would have been conducted in Aramaic, the
word kepha (Greek Κηφᾶς, transliterated as Kepha or Cephas) is the
same in both cases (i.e., “You are kepha and upon this kepha...”). To
solidify Peter’s identity as the Rock, one can look no further than
the canonical Pauline literature, where Paul consistently calls Peter
by the word “Κηφᾶς.”
The rock metaphor recalls the parable of the wise man who
built his house on rock (petra) and the fool who built his house on
sand (Mt 7:24-26). When faced with the chaos of the fl ood waters,
the house built on rock did shake, but did not collapse. Likewise,
JOEY BELLEZA
23
the apostle has shown great wisdom through his confession, and
Jesus decides to build his church on Peter. And when faced with the
onslaught of infernal fury, there is no guarantee that this greater
house will not shake. What is promised is this: through the powers
of sin may shake the foundation, the gates of hell shall not pre-vail.
Gianfranco Ravasi, referring to the many rock motifs in found
in the Hebrew scriptures such in as Psalm 18, adds, “Quante volte
nell’Antico Testamento Dio era cantato come la rupe incrollabile e sicura, la
rocciaforte inattacabile, il picco roccioso invalicabile dalle forze del male,”6
affi rming the signifi cance of the name “Rock” as an Old Testament
title exclusively granted to God. Ravasi continues, saying that “solo
Cristo e Pietro ricevono questo appellativo,”7 in the New Testament, un-derscoring
the weighty implication of Peter’s name.
Matthew’s audience of Jewish–Christians, undoubtedly familiar
with the stories of Abraham, Sarah, and Israel (Jacob), would have
understood the signifi cance of being granted a new name. While
the refusal of God to be named signifi ed that none shall have power
over him (cf. Ex 3:14-15), the granting of a new name to human be-ings
means precisely that God has power over him or her; likewise,
Peter, like Abraham and Israel before him, must be servant to his
name, and in doing so he participates in the ministry specially laid
out for him by Christ.
This is why Matthew’s Peter cannot be recognized simply as
a mere spokesman or as primus inter pares; the blessing of Christ
directed specifi cally to this apostle plus the conferral of a name
indicates the granting of a special status, a real primacy among the
apostles. Bonnard notes that in v. 18, “Pierre [...] répond, sans doute au
nom des disciples mais non simplement comme leur porte-parole, car il sera
félicité personnellement par le Christ matthéen.”8
The Petrine confession and the response of Jesus to that con-fession
can be viewed as an unfolding of the truth proclaimed in
the shema. The fi rst revelation of God to Moses established God as
the supreme Being, the One who exists (yhwh), who communicates
this truth to his people Israel, and who he calls by name. In Peter,
we see a defi nitive response to that call of God. The God of Moses,
once wholly transcendent and ineff able to the Jews, has shown his
face in the person of Jesus, and in doing so, God can also be called
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
24
by name, for he has taken on human nature. Peter recognizes this
fact, and defi nitively calls God by name. Christ reciprocates, call-ing
Peter by a new name, blessing him, and bestowing on him a
new identity because of his faith.
The triple structure of the shema is replicated three times in
our pericope. Simon’s confession, which is itself an ontological
statement, begins by calling upon the identity of the Christ, fol-lowed
by two phrases which further explain his identity. In verse
17, it is Jesus who affi rms Simon’s faith, solemnly calling him by his
legal name, followed by two phrases which explain the nature of his
blessedness. Finally in verse 18, Christ gives Simon his new name,
followed by a two-fold elucidation on the purpose of his name.
Given Matthew’s overarching theological concern, (namely, that
Jesus the Messiah and fulfi llment of Jewish scripture) it is hard to
dismiss the almost liturgical and legalistic imitation of the shema’s
rhetorical arrangement as merely incidental. On the contrary, we
fi nd a deliberate pattern which indicates a close and progressive
relationship between Jewish ontology, Christian ontology, and the
Petrine primacy.
Verses 17-18 hold two additional “keys” to our understanding
of this pericope. The phrase “Blessed are you” belongs to the lan-guage
of the beatitudes. The phrase “I say to you” belongs to the
language of commandment and prophecy. Both formulas are used
in contexts of solemn signifi cance and universal import; that they
are also used in reference to Peter in these verses suggests that
Peter himself has a function or an offi ce of universal import for
Deuteronomy 6:4
Hear, O Israel,
the Lord our God,
The Lord is One.
Matthew 16:16
You are the Christ,
the Son of God,
[of] the Living one.
Matthew 16:17
Blessed are you, Simon
son of Jonah,
for fl esh and blood has
not revealed this to you,
but my Father
in heaven.
Matthew 16:18
I say to you, you are
Peter,
and upon this rock
I will build my Church,
and the gates of hell
shall not prevail against
it.
JOEY BELLEZA
25
the church.
What is the nature of the church that Jesus will build? Let us
embark on a brief etiological exploration. In the masoretic text of the
Bible, qahal is the Hebrew word used to describe a group that is called
together, a popular assembly of sorts called for religious or juridical
purposes. When the Hebrew text was transliterated into Greek, the
editors of the Seputagint used the term ἐκκλησία, derived from the
verb καλεο, “to call,”augmented with the prefi x εκ-, cognate with the
Latin ex-, which roughly means “out of”; the Greek translation there-fore
maintained much of the same meaning of the original Hebrew
term, since they more or less described the similar institutions for
each respective civilization.9 In ancient Athens, the ekklesia was a pop-ular
assembly likewise called to vote on issues aff ecting the body poli-tic.
That this word was adopted by the communities of the nascent
Christian religion to describe their gatherings implies that the early
Christians also considered themselves “called” out of the world unto
Jesus—the Christians are responders to the call of the communica-tive
God. Those who are called out therefore also have a rudimentary
form of government which, like its linguistic precedents in the Jewish
qahal and the Athenian ἐκκλησία, implies a governing structure with
juridical authority. Christ, the rejected one turned cornerstone (cf. Ps
118:22-23; Mt 22:42), is the source of this authority granted to Peter,
whom Christ constituted the rock of the church.
Verse 19
Just as Christ in verse 18 says, “I will build my church” (οἰκοδομήσω;
future tense), he likewise tells Peter “I will give you the keys to the
kingdom of heaven” (δώσω σοι τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς βασιλείας τῶν
οὐρανῶν). The granting of a pledge in this manner harks back to the
covenental language of Genesis, where the enumeration of God’s
many promises to Abraham are all told in future tense:
No longer shall your name be Abram; your name shall be Abra-ham,
for I am making you the father of a host of nations. I will
render you exceedingly fertile; I will make nations of you; kings
shall stem from you. I will maintain my covenant with you and your
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
26
descendents after you throughout the ages as an everlasting pact,
to be your God and the God of your descendents after you. I will
give to you and your descendents after you the land in which you
are now staying, the whole land of Canaan, as a permanent pos-session,
and I will be their God. (Gn 17:4-8)
One of the hallmarks of a biblical covenant is perpetuity. The
promise that “the gates hell will not prevail against” the church al-ready
alludes to its everlasting character; this concept is solidifi ed,
petrifi ed (if one will permit) through the use of explicit covenantal
language. The discussion of perpetual covenant must precede all
questions concerning Petrine succession, but we shall not occupy
ourselves with that subject here, for it is outside the scope of our
investigation.
The so-called “power of the keys” and the reference to binding
and loosing evoke the memory of Eliakim, King of Judah, a man
loyal to the Lord. The prophet, as the mouthpiece of God, foretells
the downfall of the scribe Shebna, who has attached himself to
worldly things, saying to Shebna (note the use of future tense, and
the triple structure of the initial conferral of authority, which will
be indicated below):
(i) I will summon my servant Eliakim, son of Hilkiah; (ii) I will
clothe him with your robe, and gird him with your sash, (iii) and give
him over to your authority. He shall be a father to the inhabitants of
Jerusalem and to the house of Judah. I will place the key of the
house of David on his shoulder; when he opens, no one shall
shut, when he shuts, no one shall open. I will fi x him like a peg
in a sure spot, to be a place of honor for his family; on him shall
hang all the glory of his family... (Is 24:20-24)
Even here, the motif of “sturdiness” (later applied to Peter
the rock) fi gures prominently. The authority of the deputy derives
directly from the authority of the King; in this relationship lies
the power of the offi ce. Keys, an ancient symbol of authority, are
granted to both Eliakim and Peter; Eliakim exercises it in the royal
House of David, while Peter exercises his authority on earth and
JOEY BELLEZA
27
in the kingdom of heaven. The Greek word βασιλεία, just like the
word ἐκκλησία, already carries connotations of juridical force,
providing the biblical basis for a system of canon law. In each case,
it is God who grants the authority to a special man as his ambas-sador
or vice-regent, who acts by the authority and in the person of
the divine King, who is God alone. Peter, therefore, can open and
shut, bind and loose, confi dent in the promise that his judgments
are ratifi ed in heaven.
Though Jesus still speaks to Peter alone in this verse, the power
to bind and loose are granted to all the apostles in Mt 18:18. It
is important, however, to remember that the power of the keys
is bestowed uniquely upon Peter. The power to bind and loose in
Mt 18, based on the proximate context, applies specifi cally to the
disciplinary power to exclude those who cannot reconcile them-selves
with the church and who refuse to faithfully answer the call
of the ekklesia—here the apostles receive the authority to impose
excommunication and the authority to absolve. In 16:19 (in con-trast
to the rest of the disciples), Peter alone receives the keys and
the accompanying authority to bind and loose in a most universal
sense, for the keys which Christ gives are the keys to the entire
kingdom.
Verse 20
The appearance of the “Messianic secret” after Peter’s confession
is also found in the Marcan parallel; yet even in Mark, the con-fession
at Caesarea Philippi is only in this episode where Jesus
specifi cally prohibits his disciples from telling anybody that he is
the Messiah. All other instances of “the secret” in Mark deal with
people who have been healed but who do not confess Jesus’ divine
nature. Jesus’ time to emphatically reveal his identity to the whole
world had not yet arrived. Just as God spoke to Abraham in the
future tense to indicate that Abraham’s promise to circumcise his
household had not yet been fulfi lled; Jesus speaks likewise since
he has not yet shed the requisite blood for the ratifi cation of the
new covenant.
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
28
Conclusion:
Is Matthew’s Peter an Appropriate Model for the Church?
As mentioned in the introduction, our pericope, while a funda-mental
aspect of the modern Petrine doctrine, is nonetheless in-suffi
cient in itself as justifi cation for the papacy as it exists today.
One must refer to other passages in the Bible as well as to the writ-ings
of the early Church Fathers in order to construct a compre-hensive
case in defense of the papal offi ce. Accordingly, the results
of exegetical study concerning the fi gure of Peter in the Gospel of
Matthew are often split, largely among denominational lines.
C.C. Caragounis, representing the Orthodox school of thought,
retains the old Attic Greek distinction between petros and petra
which no longer existed in New Testament times. Furthermore,
he appeals to a hypothesized Aramaic basis of the Greek gospel
(a claim which is indecisive), saying that the supposed underlying
Aramaic word is not kepha but trna10 (the two words have diff erent
connotations in Aramaic). This is obviously an assertion to reject
outright if we consider the name “Cephas” an authentic Pauline
reference to Peter.
Protestants are often more fundamental in their critique of
Matthew’s Peter. Garland notes that in the “fi fteen incidents in the
Gospel that specifi cally involve [Peter] portray him as rash, con-fused,
desirous of reward, overconfi dent, faltering, and cowardly—
in other words, he represents a normal disciple.”11 The “rock” is not
Peter, but his confession—the statement of faith is the foundation
for the Church. Gundry, presupposing the petros–petra dichotomy,
argues in the same manner, saying that Peter represents every dis-ciple
who falters and then returns to faith.12 He is not a minister of
extraordinary power, merely a literary archetype which represents
every Christian who reads the gospel.
All these assertions, in one way or another, ignore some fun-damental
aspect of Matthew’s theological concern. The themes in
Matthew (recall that he writes for a primarily Jewish–Christian au-dience)
are Jewish to the core:
JOEY BELLEZA
29
Matthew’s Jewish bend of mind is apparent even to the casual
reader. He leaves unexplained many Jewish terms and customs
such as handwashing, the nature of the two didrachma, the seat
of Moses, phylacteries and fringes, and fl ight on the Sabbath, as-suming
his reader had some notion of what is being talked about.
He goes to some lengths to demonstrate the Jesus was the son
of David, a title highlighted in Matthew, and that he has met all
qualifi cations to be the messiah of Israel.13
Our pericope is likewise loaded with powerful Old Testament
motifs, surely familiar to Matthew’s Jewish audience (shema, cov-enantal
language, the granting of a new name, keys, binding and
loosing), all of which contribute to the understanding that Peter
has an authentic primacy not only of place but of authority. Ac-cording
to Bonsirven, the “Semitic fl avor” (saveur sémitique) of
Matthew’s language in 16:17-19 “est déjà un présomption en faveur de
leur authenticité,”14 and accordingly we cannot simply gloss over the
words without examining the powerful eff ect which it possesses
over the Jewish–Christian consciousness.
Directly following our pericope comes the fi rst prediction of
the passion (16:21-23). As Peter rebukes Jesus, and in turn Jesus re-sponds:
“Get behind me, Satan! You are an obstacle [σκάνδαλον,
skandalon; literally, ‘stumbling block’] to me.” In the Greek text,
“Satan” (Σατανᾶ) is transliterated directly from the Hebrew (ha-
Satan; the tempter or accuser), which tells us that it is used by Mat-thew
as a proper name. Jesus’ counter-rebuke therefore addresses
not Peter, but the one who has temporarily taken hold of him.
How can Peter be the sturdy rock of foundation for the church
when here, immediately after the conferral of the keys, he is easily
swayed by the Evil One?
We need not look further than the depraved, nepotistic corrup-tion
of the Borgia, Della Rovere, and Medici popes to see examples
of the so-called petros become true skandalon, thinking and acting
“not as God does, but as human beings do” (16:23). We can easily
imagine a a frightened renaissance Pontiff on his deathbed, fear-ing
the verdict of the Judge who will surely pronounce unto him:
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
30
vade retro Satana, quia scandalum mihi es! Yet despite the decadent
excesses of the historical papacy, not one of the men who held the
offi ce, not even the supremely scandalous Alexander VI, taught
any doctrine contrary to the basic Christian confession the Jesus
is the Messiah. Not one dared to reverse the dogmatic defi nitions
of their predecessors or those of the ecumenical councils. And in
this sense, the church, like the house built on rock, was still shaken
by the chaotic onslaught of sin, but was not toppled—sin did not
prevail against it.
Nau takes the Protestant argument further and suggests that,
through convoluted semantic analysis and redaction criticism, Mat-thew’s
Christ in 16:13-20 is actually employing “rhetorical dispraise”
to describe Peter, a sort of ironic statement which actually condemns
Peter for the fi fteen episodes of un-rock-like imperfection in Mat-thew
mentioned by Garland. One of the central pieces to his argu-ment
is the fact that in the resurrection narrative, whereas Mark’s
angel (or messenger) says in Mk 16:7: “But go tell the disciples and
Peter, [Jesus] is going before you to Galilee...’” Matthew 28:7 reads,
“He has been raised from the dead and he is going before you to
Galilee; there will you see him.” The mention of Peter is ominously
removed (redacted) from Matthew’s post-resurrection account,
and Nau takes this as particularly damning evidence that turns the
“Petrine syndrome,” the widespread hermeneutical tendency to be-stow
a primacy on Peter, on its head. As a result, the last explicit
reference to Peter in Matthew is that of a sorrowful apostle weep-ing
bitterly in the night, ashamed for having betrayed his Master
(cf. 26:69–75). “Peter plays no individual part at all in the resurrec-tion
or in the disciples’ response to the resurrection in Matthew’s
portrayal,” being left instead to “fade away and become absorbed in
the faceless company of ‘the eleven’”15 at the gospel’s end. For Nau,
this is enough to dislodge Peter from his traditional place.
All this, however, fl ies in the face of what we understand about
the concept of perpetuity in covenantal theology. Silence concern-ing
Peter in the ever-so-brief post-resurrection narrative does not
necessarily imply Matthean condemnation; it merely indicates a
shift in emphasis to Jesus without explicitly denying what was pre-
JOEY BELLEZA
31
viously promised to Peter. Matthew’s concern in his resurrec-tion
story is not to anathematize Peter. His intent here, as in
the rest of his text, refl ects his overarching theological theme:
Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah of the Jews, the Christ, Son
of the living God. And if we remember that Matthew makes
Peter the primordial human mouthpiece for this fundamental
Christological statement, it is increasingly diffi cult to subscribe
to Nau’s theory of Matthean “ironic dispraise.” The primacy of
authority must belong to Peter, for in Matthew’s gospel, it is
through the decisive testimony of this disciple that the theo-logical
ontology of God at last found its revolutionary consum-mation
in Christology.
Notes
1. New American Bible; this will be consistently used as our English
text. Translations of other non-English sources are made by the
author.
2. Marie–Joseph Lagrange, Evangile selon Saint Matthieu. (Paris: J.
Gablada, 1948), 321. “The voice of the Transfi guration can be re-garded
as a confi rmation by the Father, addressed to James and
John, of that which Peter had said [the confession]. One could
very well place, as we now propose, the confession before the
Transfi guration in the order of events.”
3. Pierre Bonnard, L’Evangile selon Saint Matthieu. (Neuchatel:
Delachâux et Niestle, 1963), 243. “The verb ἠρώτα can take on
the two meaning of asking (something to somebody) and to in-terrogate;
Matthew means the second meaning.”
4. Erasmo Leiva–Merikakis, Fire of Mercy, Heart of the Word: Medita-tion
on the Gospel according to St. Matthew, vol 2. (San Francisco:
Ignatius, 2003), 512.
5. Leiva–Merikakis, 515.
6. Gianfranco Ravasi, Secondo le Scritture: doppio commento alle letture
della domenica, anno A. (Cassale Monferrato: Piemme, 1999), 240.
“How many times in the Old Testament, God is invoked as the
safe, unshakeable cliff , the unassailable stronghold, the rocky
summit insurmountable to the forces of evil.”
THE PETRINE CONFESSION AS THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY
32
7. Ravasi, 240. “only Christ and Peter receive this title.” cf. Mt 21:42; Ps
118:22-23.
8. Bonnard, 244. “Peter responds without a doubt in the name of the
disciples but not only as their spokesman, due to the fact that will be
rewarded personally by the Matthean Christ.”
9. Joseph A. Ratzinger, Called to Communion: Understanding the Church
Today trans. Adrian Walker. (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1996), 30.
10. Chrys C. Caragounis, Peter and the Rock trans. E. Gräßer. (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1990), 90-91.
11. David E. Garland, Reading Matthew: A literary and theological commen-tary
on the fi rst Gospel. (New York: Crossroad, 1993),170-171
12. Robert H. Gundry, Matthew: A commentary on his literary and theological
art. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982),
334.
13. Garland, 2.
14. Joseph Bonsirven. Théologie du Nouveau Testament. (Paris: Aubier, 1951),
88. “is already a presumption in favor of its authenticity.”
15. Arlo J. Nau, Peter in Matthew: Discipleship, diplomacy, and dispraise. (Col-legeville,
MN: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 65-66.
MADISON RUSSELL
33
WRITER’S COMMENTS
In Professor Holler’s Written and Oral Communication II course, our
class was assigned the challenge of constructing a Rogerian-based
argument. If successful, the essay would strive to demonstrate the
validity of different positions and aim to reach common ground on a
particular issue. Considering the guidelines for the assignment as well
as my interest in constitutional law, I chose to research the recent
lawsuit, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, from the time the complaint
was initially fi led in 2004 to the fi nal oral arguments heard before the
U.S. Supreme Court this spring (April 2010). After in-depth analysis
and discussion of both sides of the case, I was able to understand the
fascinating legal principles associated with it, and ultimately, make my
own case.
—Madison Russell
INSTRUCTOR’S COMMENTS
Madison demonstrates here, as she did throughout my yearlong
Written and Oral Communication class, that she is in command of
a complex argument. One additional challenge of this assignment,
however, was that the suggested format of the essay was “Rogerian,”
an approach based on the principles of Carl Rogers. This style of essay
calls for the writer to be as restrained and respectful as possible when
treating opposing arguments. The case Madison argues here (which
was literally undecided when she wrote this essay) was extremely con-tentious,
cutting to the heart of First Amendment protections. Madison
artfully maintains her neutrality as she presents the powerful virtues of
her opposition’s main points, yet she does not in any way compromise
her principled stand. This essay, I believe, is merely Exhibit A in what I
hope will be a long and disinguished law career for Madison Russell.
—David Holler, Rhetoric and Language
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
34
MADISON RUSSELL
The Right to Discriminate:
An Analysis of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
Introduction
A CASE THAT LIES IN THE INTERSECTION between diff erent constitu-tional
values … [a] clash between autonomy, speech and associ-ation
on one hand, and the very important constitutional values of
equality on the other,” proclaimed Vikram Amar, Associate Dean
for Academic Aff airs at University of California Davis School of
Law and former law professor at University of California Hastings
School of Law in San Francisco, as he described the recent dispute
between a conservative Christian group and a public university
(“College Social Groups and Discrimination”). In September 2004,
the UC Hastings administration was informed that its Christian
Legal Society chapter (commonly referred to as CLS) had begun to
exclude gay, lesbian, bisexual and non-Christian law students from
becoming members and offi cers. Leaders of CLS were requiring a
signed commitment statement, known as the CLS Statement of
Faith, which outlined promises to uphold “orthodox” evangelical
Christian values (Bulwa par. 2). According to the statement, law
students were ineligible, and therefore, immediately rejected if
they “[advocated] or unrepentantly [engaged] in sexual conduct
outside of marriage between a man and a woman” (Bulwa par. 4).
After admitting to such exclusivity, CLS asked school offi cials that
their group, along with all other religious student organizations,
be exempted from the university’s fi rm non-discrimination policy
(CLS). Like several other American law schools, UC Hastings had
previously adopted an anti-discrimination policy to protect its stu-dents;
documentation which prohibited discrimination on the ba-
“
MADISON RUSSELL
35
sis of “race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age,
sex or sexual orientation” (Dorf par. 3). In response, UC Hastings
denied CLS’s exemption request, and ceased to provide them with
any additional public funding or support (Bulwa pars. 5-6). One
month later, in October 2004, the Christian Legal Society sued UC
Hastings School of Law (Bulwa par. 3).
During the U.S. District Court trial in San Francisco, Judge Jef-frey
White ruled in favor of Hastings (Bulwa par. 7). Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (also in San Francisco) agreed, de-claring
that the public school has the right to require its student
organizations to “accept all comers as members” (Bulwa par. 7). On
May 5, 2009, seeking a reversal of the Ninth Circuit Court’s deci-sion,
CLS fi led a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court (CLS). On December 7, 2009, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, and will decide
over the summer of 2010 whether UC Hastings can legally refuse
to recognize, support and/or fund the Christian Legal Society stu-dent
group on account of its discriminatory practices (“College
Social Groups and Discrimination”). Overall, the case will have
a dramatic impact on the future of public universities across the
country, as well as their student-run organizations. It has stirred
the long debate over not only gay rights and equalities, but ortho-dox
religious groups who argue that their constitutional liberties
are being violated when they are forced to tolerate views counter-ing
their own (Bulwa par. 2).
CLS’s Claims
With student chapters at one hundred-sixty fi ve law schools in the
United States, the Christian Legal Society is an accomplished or-ganization
that integrates the study of law with spirituality and up-standing
moral values. Prior to 2004, the CLS chapter at UC Hast-ings
had been fully recognized for more than a decade, during which
time, the group was open to all prospective law students. When
CLS placed strict limitations on member admission, Hastings with-drew
certain non-monetary support as well as approximately $250—
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
36
money specifi cally assigned to assist CLS offi cers with their travel
expenses to the organization’s national conference (Bulwa par. 13).
In its own defense, CLS claims it has exercised its constitutionally
protected rights, such as freedom of speech, religion and associa-tion.
Kim Colby, an attorney for the CLS, stated: “Religious groups
have a right to require their offi cers to share their religious faith”;
Colby’s opinion aims to explain the appropriateness and legality
of the organization’s actions (Bulwa par. 10). CLS therefore argues
that its First Amendment rights are being violated by UC Hastings,
particularly the right of expressive association, and the right to be
free from viewpoint discrimination (CLS).
The First Amendment protects “the right of the people peace-ably
to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances,” but the right of association becomes ambiguous and not
specifi cally defi ned in the Constitution. The concept itself, however,
is simple and sensible, as Cornell Law professor and FindLaw writer,
Michael C. Dorf, explains: “Individuals seeking to express a view-point—
and thus to exercise their First Amendment rights—will of-ten
have diffi culty doing so eff ectively, unless they can band together
with other like-minded individuals to generate and disseminate their
message” (Dorf par. 7). In this particular case, CLS asserts that their
right of expressive association is being violated when the organiza-tion
is forced to accept members and offi cers who hold beliefs and/
or engage in behavior that opposes the group’s shared commitments;
which in turn, hinders their message. To Gregory Baylor, senior legal
counsel for the CLS, the right of a religious chapter to associate with
those of their choosing is essential to the group’s wellbeing:
I think that Hastings is violating the rights not just of religious
student groups, not just of Christian Legal Society, but of all
student organizations to share common beliefs together around
those commitments, and to exercise their beliefs … I just don’t
see the reason why Hastings needs to interfere with the ability of
groups to gather around shared commitments, and why it’s sin-gling
out Christian Legal Society for this policy. (“College Social
Groups and Discrimination”)
MADISON RUSSELL
37
In addition to expressive association, CLS contends that their
right to be free from viewpoint discrimination is also being violated.
(Though a more subtle, but equally substantial concept within the
First Amendment, the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination
is obstructed when a group is treated diff erently than another group
on a social, monetary and/or legal basis because of its beliefs.) As a
religious student organization, CLS feels that its right was infringed
upon when Hastings denied its exemption request, and stopped
public funding and support. CLS points to the fact that every other
recognized student organization on campus is still receiving funds—
even when some have admitted to exclusion themselves. In a recent
KQED radio interview, Baylor also interjected:
Hastings is really the outlier here—they’re doing something
unique in discriminating against all student groups that want to
foster their messages by selecting leaders and voters and mem-bers
who share their commitments. (“College Social Groups and
Discrimination”)
No Legal Protection for Gays and Lesbians
The legal briefs in the District, Ninth Circuit and now, Supreme
Court, all agree that gays, lesbians and/or bisexuals are not legally
protected from discrimination under state law or the U.S. Constitu-tion
vis-à-vis Title IX, the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other
federal legislation. If, for example, CLS were to also prohibit Afri-can-
Americans, women, disabled students or senior citizens from
joining, there would be no case here. The Supreme Court would
reference the concept of insular minorities and fi nd that the Chris-tian
Legal Society was being discriminatory on account of race, sex,
disability or age; all having been deemed insular minorities or special
groups protected under state and federal law. If a public university
supported or fi nanced discrimination against those groups, it would
not pass legal scrutiny. Yet, gays, lesbians and bisexuals are not clas-sifi
ed as an insular minority (a term fi rst employed by Supreme Court
Justice Harlan F. Stone in the 1938 case, United States v. Carolene
Products Company to describe any entity facing prejudice; yet since
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
38
the 1960s, has been used by the Court to refer to “any group(s)
that have been saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-traordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process,”
which commonly includes racial and ethnic minorities, but not
sexually-oriented groups [Erler]). Both sides in the CLS case,
therefore, argue over what legal rights, if any, gays, lesbians and
bisexuals can and should be aff orded. Can they be discriminated
against in the name of religious beliefs, or is sexual orientation
now a characteristic worthy of legal protection? In many ways,
the unclear legal status of homosexual and bisexual discrimina-tion
is what makes this case so diffi cult.
Religious Freedom v. Basic Equality: A Diffi cult Choice
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez is an interesting case with no
clear right or wrong answer—only two potential outcomes that
now must be decided by nine individuals acting as one group
collectively. The Supreme Court could possibly rule in favor
of the Christian Legal Society, taking the stance that CLS was
within its constitutional rights to exclude certain “non-protect-ed”
students from membership. As a result, UC Hastings would
be required to reinstate the group, and continue public support
and funding for CLS in the future. Additionally, the Court would
establish a new legal principle to allow religious student organi-zations
in public universities to be exclusive when confronted
with diff erentiating views, lifestyles (and thus, people) that ne-gate
their message or threaten their very existence. However, on
the other hand, if the Supreme Court affi rms the District Court
as well as the Ninth Circuit Court’s position, it will rule in favor
of UC Hastings, and require CLS to be open to all students,
regardless of sexual orientation; that is, if CLS desires university
support and recognition. Such a decision would have signifi cant
impacts not only on public universities across the country, but
their student-run organizations, and the rights off ered to gay,
lesbian and bisexual students.
Yet, from both a legal and moral standpoint, Christian Legal
MADISON RUSSELL
39
Society v. Martinez raises an array of diffi cult questions: Does UC
Hastings, or any public university for that matter, have the legal
right (or obligation) to cease public funding and support on ac-count
of discrimination? Does it matter that the discrimination
was practiced in connection with religious exercise and associa-tion?
Is the law school being discriminatory against the CLS be-cause
they themselves were being discriminatory? Alternatively,
is CLS within their own First Amendment rights to affi liate with
only those of their choosing? Does the First Amendment pro-vide
them with the justifi cation to be discriminatory on account
of expressive association and other clauses? If so, can they expect
the public to fi nance and support their cause? At the same time,
in 21st century American society, what constitutes “discrimina-tion”
and on what grounds can someone be discriminatory or
discriminated against? Is society’s defi nition any diff erent than
the law’s defi nition? If so, is it imperative that we begin to inte-grate
society’s views into the law?
These complex questions have all been posed by lawyers,
students, and activists across the country. On April 19, 2010, the
Supreme Court heard the oral arguments from the attorneys
representing Christian Legal Society as well as those defending
UC Hastings. The Justices will reach a decision on the case by
the end of summer 2010.
Equality Should Prevail
If the gay, lesbian and bisexual community will ever receive the
legal recognition, protection and equality it deserves, particu-larly
in an educational setting, it will be based on the outcome
of a fi nal ruling in a case like this one. In his 2000 book, God’s
Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics, Stephen
L. Carter, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale
Law School with a special focus on constitutional law, writes ex-tensively
on the First Amendment as well as the relationship be-tween
religion and law; the separation between church and state.
In the following passage, Carter clarifi es his view of American
society today, and the government’s connection with morality:
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
40
In modern, religiously pluralistic America, where, as we have seen,
the religions play vital roles as independent sources of meaning
for their adherents, this means that the government should nei-ther
force people into sectarian religious observances, such as
classroom prayer in public schools, nor favor some religions over
others, as by erecting a crèche paid for with public funds, nor
punish people for their religiosity without a very strong reason
other than prejudice. (Carter 103)
In response, one could be compelled to pose additional inqui-ries,
such as: What or rather, who exactly, defi nes the “very strong
reason other than prejudice”? Is prejudice no longer a legitimate rea-son?
Does that equate to the infringement on other people’s rights,
specifi cally basic human rights and decencies? Again, who decides
when the government can and should become involved in this type
of punishment; and who or what precisely is that entity—the Su-preme
Court? Elected offi cials? The people?
When the government provides political, legal and/or monetary
support of one specifi c religion in any fashion vis-à-vis for example,
educational endowments, service grants, formal recognition, or in this
case, exemptions in favor of that religion, it may be more detrimental
in the long-run to our society than for the government to support no
religion at all. Once one group is supported over another, court cases
will be initiated on a recurring basis; all participants requesting the
same equal treatment: each wanting to discriminate equally. In other
words, if the Supreme Court or any branch of government sanctions
one religious group’s discrimination because it is allegedly necessary
to preserve their message, that is favoritism, which, in and of itself,
is hypocritical and anti-democratic. Therefore, the traditional sepa-ration
of church and state is not only a logical foundation for the
United States, but vital in maintaining the democracy and values of
equality upon which this country was founded. Although one may
empathize with the Christian Legal Society’s argument, and strongly
believe that the ability to practice religion freely and without con-sequence
or cohesion is fundamentally important, CLS publicly dis-criminated
against a certain group for their ideas, lifestyle choices,
and perhaps innate characteristics. Furthermore, they wanted public
funds and support to do so. In essence, they demanded that society
provide a vehicle for their religious beliefs and help foster discrimi-
MADISON RUSSELL
41
nation and prejudice. That prejudice, as noted in Professor Carter’s
argument, is a “strong [enough] reason“ for the Supreme Court to
rule in favor of UC Hastings. Secularism, equality, and the prohibi-tion
of ideological prejudice holds a deeper merit, and should prevail
in this timeless case between religion and law.
Author’s Postscript
Following the oral arguments on April 19, 2010, the Supreme
Court was faced with a diffi cult question, as proclaimed by Justice
Ginsburg: “May a public law school condition its offi cial recogni-tion
of a student group—and the attendant use of school funds
and facilities—on the organization’s agreement to open eligibil-ity
for membership and leadership to all students?” (Ginsburg 1).
In a close 5–4 vote, the Justices affi rmed the District and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision, and on June 28, 2010, ruled in
favor of UC Hastings. Justice Ginsburg wrote the Opinion of the
Court, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer and
Sotomayor. Ginsburg’s opinion established the fact that Hast-ings’
non-discrimination policy was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral
for CLS as well as any other student assembled organiza-tion.
Hastings had not impermissibly denied CLS public funds
or formal recognition—in fact, the law school was correct and
legally bound to reject CLS’s exemption request from the non-discrimination
policy.
Though in agreement with Ginsburg’s viewpoint, Justices Ken-nedy
and Stevens wrote their own concurring opinions. While
Kennedy discussed rights of expressive association and established
himself as clearly the “swing” vote in the case, Stevens issued a well-written,
logical argument on allocating public resources. In the fol-lowing
passage, he articulates his position—the First Amendment
allowed and will continue to allow CLS to be exclusionary, but not at
the expense of the State:
Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews, blacks, and women−or
those who do not share their contempt for Jews, blacks, and
women. A free society must tolerate such groups. It need not
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
42
subsidize them, give them its offi cial imprimatur, or grant
them equal access to law school facilities. (Stevens 6)
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas maintained a much diff er-ent
perspective—CLS’s rights of free speech, religion and expressive
association were blatantly violated, and will remain unprotected if
Hastings is permitted to insist that student organizations accept “all
comers” as members, even those opposed to the group‘s fundamental
beliefs and message. Justice Alito considers the interesting possibil-ity
that “political correctness in our country’s institutions of higher
learning,” such as the social rights and sensitivities being extended
to gays and lesbians in the twenty-fi rst century, may be more detri-mental
to the principles of free expression (for the sake of religions),
than the alternative (Alito 1). His opening statement and subsequent
opinion present a powerful and refl ective outlook; one which poses
serious questions about the constitutional rights of groups and reli-gious
organizations to be exclusive in a democratic and egalitarian-based
society: “The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence
is that we protect the freedom to express the thought that we hate
the most” (Alito 1).
The Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez resolves CLS’s instant dispute with UC Hastings. However,
it is doubtful that we have seen the end of constitutional challeng-es
over the balance between enforcing non-discrimination policies
in public forums on one hand, and allowing religious and political
free expression on the other—even if doing so, entails further dis-crimination
and exclusion. “Exclusion, after all,” Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged, “has two sides” (Ginsburg 28).
Works Cited
Aden, Steven H. Letter to Judy Chapman. 23 September 2004. Center
for Law and Religious Freedom: Annadale, Virginia.
Alito, Samuel. “Alito, J., dissenting.” Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.
No. 08-1371. 561 U.S. 2010. Supreme Court of the U.S. 28 June 2010.
MADISON RUSSELL
43
Bulwa, Demian. “Christian group vs. Hastings – court to decide.” SF-Gate.
8 December 2009. Web. 14 December 2009.
Carter, Stephen L. God’s Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in
Politics. Basic Books: New York, 2000. Print.
Chapman, Judy. “Letter to Steven H. Aden.” 1 October 2004. Offi ce of
the General Counsel, University of California Hastings College of
the Law: San Francisco.
“Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (UC Hastings).” CLS. Web. 1 Feb-ruary
2010.
“College Social Groups and Discrimination.” Forum with Michael
Krasny. KQED Public Media. National Public Radio. 9 December
2009. Radio. Host: Michael Krasny. Guests: Ethan Schulman,
Gregory S. Baylor, Vikram Amar.
Dorf, Michael C. “The Supreme Court Reviews a Confl ict Between
Equality and Freedom of Association.” FindLaw, 14 December
2009. Web. 1 February 2010.
Erler, Edward J. “1982 Equal Protection and Personal Rights: The Re-gime
of the ‘Discrete and Insular Minority’.” Georgia Law Review
16:407-444. Web. 14 May 2010.
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader. “Opinion of the Court.” Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez. No. 08-1371. 561 U.S. 2010. Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 June 2010.
Stevens, John Paul. “Stevens, J., concurring.” Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez. No. 08-1371. 561 U.S. 2010. Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 June 2010.
Works Consulted
Attorneys for Appellant. “Brief of Appellant.” Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez. CA No. 06-15956. DC No. C 04 4484 JSW. United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 27 September 2006.
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
44
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Mary Kay Kane et al. “Brief of
Appellees.” Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. CA No. 06-15956. DC
No. C 04 4484 JSW. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 22 December 2006.
Christian Legal Society. Press Release – October 22, 2004. 22 October
2004. Web. 1 February 2010.
_____________. Press Release – April 13, 2005. 13 April 2005. Web. 1
February 2010.
_____________. Press Release – May 18, 2006. 18 May 2006. Web. 1
February 2010.
_____________. Press Release – March 9, 2009. 9 March 2009. Web. 1
February 2010.
_____________. Press Release – May 6, 2009. 6 May 2009. Web. 1
February 2010.
_____________. Press Release – December 7, 2009. 7 December 2009.
Web. 1 February 2010.
_____________. “Brief of Petitioner.” Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.
No. 08-1371. Supreme Court of the United States. 28 January 2010.
Counsel for Plaintiff Christian Legal Society Chapter of University of
California Hastings College of the Law, Hastings Christian Fellow-ship.
“Verifi ed Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.”
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. CA No. 06-15956. DC No. C 04
4484 JSW. United States District Court for the Northern District
of California: San Francisco. 22 October 2004.
_____________. “Amended Order Re Motions For Summary Judgment.”
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. CA No. 06-15956. DC No. C 04
4484 JSW. United States District Court for the Northern District
of California: San Francisco. 19 May 2006.
Kennedy, Anthony. “Kennedy, J., concurring.” Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez. No. 0A-1371. 561 U.S. 2010. Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 June 2010.
BRENNA MCCALLICK
45
WRITER’S COMMENTS
For our fi nal paper in Professor Fels’s Civil War and Reconstruction
class, we either chose to write a historiographical essay comparing
arguments of Civil War historians, or a primary source-based paper,
making an argument using original historical material. Professor Fels
gave us the freedom to explore any topic, so long as it related to
the causes, course, or aftermath of the Civil War. After reading the
speeches and papers of Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and
James Henry Hammond—each with fervent beliefs about slavery—I
wanted to look at the Constitution to determine if arguments for the
legality of slavery held true. Analyzing the Constitution quickly evolved
into analyzing the Constitutional Convention of 1787, specifi cally the
recorded discourse between state delegates. I chose to narrow the
focus of my paper by looking only at anti-slavery arguments regarding
the constitutionality of slavery, then addressing each argument with
direct quotations from the men who crafted the Constitution.
—Brenna McCallick
INSTRUCTOR’S COMMENTS
Deep confl icts among people, like the one that led to the American
Civil War, are fought out in the realm of ideas before they proceed
to the battlefi eld. Brenna McCallick has written a fi rst-rate research
paper that examines the ways in which the Constitution was used to
support or attack the institution of slavery in the years prior to the
Civil War. Most interestingly, she chooses to focus on the abolitionist
side of the argument, where controversy was actually at its highest
(white Southerners took for granted that the Constitution accepted
the legality of slavery). Skillfully analyzing the record of the debates by
the Constitutional framers, Brenna shows that extreme abolitionists
like William Lloyd Garrison were wrong to regard the Constitution
purely and simply as a pro-slavery document (Garrison’s “Covenant
with death”), while more moderate abolitionists like Frederick
Douglass and Lysander Spooner were equally mistaken to believe that
the Constitution contained a tacit condemnation of slavery etched
between its lines. Along the way, Brenna’s research sheds light on the
startling fact that Americans as a whole were more hostile to slavery
in the 1780s than they would become in the 1830s, 40s and 50s.
—Anthony Fels, Department of History
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
46
BRENNA MCCALLICK
Confl ict and Compromise:
The Constitutionality of Slavery
THE CIVIL WAR ERA has come to represent a time of great na-tional
division. Overshadowed by the division between North
and South, the divisions within confl icting ideological systems add
more complexity to understanding this era. Antebellum abolition-ists
were united in their hostility to slavery. They were divided,
however, by their contradictory interpretations of slavery in the
Constitution. Three of the most prominent fi gures of the aboli-tionist
movement—William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass,
and Lysander Spooner—fell on diff erent sides of this debate. The
radical Garrison believed that the Constitution sanctioned slavery
and supported abandoning the Union. In contrast, Douglass and
Spooner saw the founding documents as inherently antithetical to
slavery. By examining some of the records of this discourse and
debate from the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it is possible
to shed light on the founders’ intentions regarding slavery in the
nation. Indeed, the question of their intentions is a critical part of
interpreting the document itself. Despite Douglass’s and Spooner’s
vehement denial, the Constitution did accommodate slavery in the
United States. However, a careful examination of the records from
the Constitutional Convention reveals that the founders predicted
this practice would die out. Ultimately in their respective analyses
of the Constitution, Garrison was too negative, Douglass too posi-tive,
and Spooner too literal.
Some of the strongest voices arguing the pro-slavery nature of
the founding documents belonged to abolitionists. These fi gures,
believing there to be no room for democracy in a nation whose
creed so blatantly bars millions of people from freedom, sought to
BRENNA MCCALLICK
47
abandon the Union. One such fi gure was Garrison, a radical aboli-tionist
from Massachusetts. He outlined his case against the Con-stitution
thus:
The Constitution is not a statute, but a UNION, a COMPACT
formed between separate and independent colonies, with con-fl
icting interests and diverse sentiments, to be reconciled in
the best manner possible, by concession and compromise…
What those concessions and compromises were, all knew when
the compact was framed and adopted; they related to the pros-ecution
of the foreign slave trade for twenty years, to the al-lowance
of a slave representation in Congress, to the hunting
of fugitive slaves, and to the suppression of domestic insurrec-tions,
for the special benefi t of the slave States; and to direct
taxation and the navigation laws in behalf of the free States.1
In the latter part of this important passage, Garrison lists his four
main grievances with the Constitution. This list represents the most
commonly cited Constitutional provisions regarding the question
of slavery. Garrison acknowledges that the document was created
as a compromise to hold together a precarious bond between the
states. He subsequently implies that concerns about the freedom
and welfare of slaves were easily overlooked for the sake of politics.
As far as his emphasis on compromise goes, Garrison is cor-rect.
The founders did make compromises between states in the
interest of establishing a Union. James Madison, the “Father of
the Constitution,” believed that the existence of many diff ering
interests would ultimately ensure that one interest would not gain
a tyrannical power over the others. In other words, the necessity
of compromise ensured political stability. Whatever the founders’
feelings on the issue of emancipation, eliminating slavery through
the Constitution was out of the question. Benjamin Franklin, Pres-ident
of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, even rejected his own
organization’s petition to abolish slavery within the Constitution,
conceding that “the memorial, in the beginning of the delibera-
1. Garrison, William L. “The United States Constitution.” Selections From the Writings and
Speeches. (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 303.
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
48
tions of the [Constitutional] convention, might alarm some of the
Southern states, and thereby defeat the wishes of the enemies of
the African trade.”2 The idea of compromise—and of inevitable
concessions—was at the heart of constructing the American Con-stitution.
Like so many other issues, the issue of slavery would
have to be handled with a compromise.
As evidenced by the records from the Convention, the issue of
slavery in the United States presented a signifi cant source of dis-cord
among the state delegates. In the end, representatives tried
to reconcile their diff erences in the interest of creating a stronger,
more stable government. The Convention delegates disagreed on
the issue of slavery and yet realized the need for a give-and-take
relationship between the states. For example, one delegate from
Connecticut, Roger Sherman, was cited in the records of the Con-vention
as disapproving “of the slave trade; yet as the States were
now possessed of the right to import slaves, as the public good did
not require it to be taken from them, and as it was expedient to
have as few objections as possible to the proposed scheme of Gov-ernment,
he thought it best to leave the matter as we fi nd it.” 3 Even
anti-slavery advocates like Sherman had to admit that the urgency
of creating a stable Union necessitated (at least temporarily) mak-ing
allowances for slavery.
Garrison understood the nature of the Constitution as a docu-ment
created through compromise but argued vehemently that it
was an ironclad agreement actually ensuring and protecting the
practice of slavery. Passages from his writings on the Constitution
such as, “[the American people] have designedly ‘framed mischief
by a law,’ and consigned to chains and infamy an inoff ensive and
helpless race,” reveal Garrison’s decidedly disapproving view not
only of the founders but of the nation as a whole. “The people of
this country,” he writes, “have bound themselves by an oath to have
no other God before them than a CONSTITUTIONAL GOD,
which their own hands have made.”4 Garrison notably groups the
founders in with the current population of the United States, imply-
2. “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery.” A Necessary Evil? Slavery and the Debate
Over the Constitution. Ed. John P. Kaminski. (Madison: Madison House, 1995), 42.
3. Kamisnki, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 59.
4. Garrison, “The Constitution of the United States,” 304.
BRENNA MCCALLICK
49
ing the shared guilt between lawmakers and adherents. “Let us con-fess
the sin of our fathers, and our own sin as a people,” he declares,
“in conspiring for the degradation and enslavement of the colored
race among us.”5 Garrison thus argued that the founders created the
Constitution with the intent of enslaving the black race.
A further examination of the records from the Constitutional
Convention challenges Garrison’s claims of plans for systematic
enslavement among the “fathers” of the nation. Many delegates
with confl icting interests shared a consensus view of the immoral-ity
of slavery. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia theorized that, “If left
to herself, [the state of Georgia] may probably put a stop to the
evil.”6 George Mason, a delegate from Virginia and a slaveholder,
conceded that slaves “produce the most pernicious eff ect on man-ners.
Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant.” He concluded,
“The General Government should have power to prevent the in-crease
of slavery.”7 Hugh Williamson, a delegate from North Caro-lina,
demonstrated the emphasis on compromise when he stated,
“both in opinion and practice he was, against slavery; but thought
it more in favor of humanity, from the view of all circumstances,
to let in South Carolina and Georgia on those terms [referring to
Article 1 Section 9, or the importation of slaves], than to exclude
them from the Union.”8 Garrison was, thus, too brash in his as-sertion
that the writers of the Constitution “conspir[ed] for the
degradation and enslavement of the colored race.” Many of the
delegates who came together to write the Constitution were in
fact opposed to slavery. Any Constitutional allowances for it re-fl
ected more the priority of establishing a Union than any ill will
toward the slaves.
In stark contrast to Garrison’s disdain for the Constitution,
other fi erce anti-slavery fi gures praised the document as a guar-antee
of liberty for all. Such advocates argued that the practice of
slavery was simply unlawful. Frederick Douglass, who saw the pos-sibility
of change without disunion, viewed the Constitution fa-vorably.
Contrary to Garrison’s views, Douglass argued in a speech
5. Garrison, “The United States Constitution,” 307.
6. Kaminski, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 60.
7. Ibid., 59.
8. Ibid., 63.
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
50
given after the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision, “The Con-stitution…
and the sentiments of the founders of the Republic,
give us a platform broad enough, and strong enough, to support
the most comprehensive plans for the freedom and elevation of
all the people of this country, without regard to color, class, or
clime.���9 In a later speech, Douglass more confi dently asserted,
“[the Founders] framed the Constitution plainly with a view to
the speedy downfall of slavery.”10 Based on this optimistic view of
the potential for national growth and the intention of the found-ers
to accommodate slavery’s downfall, Douglass argued that the
place for abolitionists was solidly within the Union, fi ghting for
the slaves.
Douglass’s statements here refl ect an almost excessive opti-mism,
but he correctly acknowledges the room for national change
within the Constitution. Turning again to the words spoken at
the convention in 1787, one fi nds evidence that emancipation—
far from being unthinkable, as Garrison believed—was actually a
topic of discussion. Roger Sherman, in fact, “observed that the
abolition of Slavery seemed to be going on in the U.S. and . . . the
good sense of the several States would probably by degrees com-plete
it.” Echoing this view, another delegate from Connecticut,
Oliver Ellsworth, stated, “Slavery in time will not be a speck in
our Country.”11 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, a proponent
of slavery, expressed his view that “If the Southern States were let
alone they will probably of themselves stop [slave] importations.”12
Each of these three opinions reveals an underlying belief in the in-evitable
end of the abuses of slavery. Douglass, therefore, was not
too far reaching in his claims about the potential for change under
the Constitution. Many delegates themselves expressed their be-liefs
in imminent changes.
Regardless of his accuracy in assuming the delegates’ hopes
for an end to slavery, Douglass was slightly too hopeful with other
claims. He focused on the actual language of the Constitution—
9. Douglass, Frederick. “The Dred Scott Decision” 1857. The Frederick Douglass Papers. Ed.
John W. Blassingame. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979-1992), 172-3.
10. Douglass, Frederick. “The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America” 1863.
The Frederick Douglass Papers. 578.
11. Kaminski, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 60.
12. Ibid.
BRENNA MCCALLICK
51
both what was declared, and what was not declared—in his rebuttal
of the “Garrisonian” view. He stated, “Neither in the preamble nor
in the body of the Constitution is there a single mention of the
term slave or slave holder, slave master or slave state . . . Neither is
there anything in the Constitution standing alone, which would
imply the existence of slavery in this country.”13 Further empha-sizing
his adamant belief in the intentional omission of the word
“slavery,” Douglass proclaimed, “When I admit that slavery is con-stitutional,
I must see slavery recognized in the Constitution. I
must see that it is there plainly stated that one man of a certain
description has a right of property in the body and soul of another
man of a certain description.”14 Arguing nobly for an anti-slavery
interpretation of the Constitution, Douglass separated the guilt of
the nation from the intent of the founders. He declared that men
like Garrison made their claims in “light of a SECRET and UN-WRITTEN
understanding of its framers, which understanding is
declared to be in favor of slavery . . . They do not point us to the
Constitution itself . . . but they delight in supposed intentions—in-tentions
no where expressed in the Constitution.”15 Distinguishing
between the practice of slavery versus the legality of it, the mind-set
of the present nation versus that of the founders, Douglass dis-misses
Garrison’s pessimism and directs his focus to the guarantee
of liberty within the Constitution itself.
While Douglass here quickly glosses over the intent of the
creators of the Constitution, this particular exemption reveals an
excessively idealistic trust in the founders’ good intentions. Un-derstanding
the Constitution as it is, not as one wishes it to be,
requires an examination of the interests that led to its creation
(which Douglass, ironically, embraces as clearly anti-slavery in his
1863 speech). Because Douglass focused so narrowly on the ex-act
wording of the Constitution, the decisions surrounding word
choice are worthy of investigation. Article 1 Section 9 presented a
wording challenge to the delegates of the 1787 Convention. This
clause declares:
13. Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision,” 176.
14. Ibid., 175
15. Ibid., 177
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
52
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be pro-hibited
by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.16
Returning once more to the Convention records, Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania allegedly proposed “making the clause read
at once, ‘the importation of slaves into North Carolina, South Car-olina
and Georgia shall not be prohibited etc.’ This he said would
be most fair and would avoid the ambiguity by which, under the
power with regard to naturalization, the liberty reserved to the
States might be defeated.” However, he added, “if the change of
language . . . should be objected to by the members from those
States, he should not urge it.” Morris, thus, proposed phrasing that
included the term “slaves.” Interestingly, in response, representa-tive
Mason “was not against using the term ‘slaves’ but against
naming North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, lest it should
give off ence to the people of those States.”17 Mason’s concern over
the approval of the white citizens, rather than the implications of
including the word “slaves,” demonstrates again the casual man-ner
in which many delegates debated an addition that might have
decisively silenced arguments of the unconstitutionality of slavery.
Douglass’s claims do hold value in that, in the end, no form of the
word “slave” can be found within the Constitution, yet he failed to
realize just how close the word came to being a part of the nation’s
founding document. Also, by not acknowledging the use of euphe-misms
in place of the word, he expressed an unrealistic optimism
in the deliberate omission of slavery.
To reinforce his belief in the goodness of the document,
Douglass pairs his argument about Constitutional wording with
a broader argument regarding the diff erence between the life and
the form of the law. “Law is in its nature opposed to wrong,” he
asserted, “and must everywhere be presumed to be in favor of
the right.”18 Sharing this belief in a “natural” law was a man whom
Douglass references in his Dred Scott Decision speech—the radical
16. Kaminski, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 55.
17. Ibid., 63.
18. Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision,” 176.
BRENNA MCCALLICK
53
abolitionist and legal expert Lysander Spooner. In The Unconstitu-tionality
of Slavery, Spooner takes many of the same liberties with
interpretation that Douglass takes. He proclaims, “If we look into
the law of nature for the meaning of the word ‘free,’ we fi nd that
by that law all mankind are free.”19 This passage not only reveals
his and Douglass’s shared belief in natural law but also their mutual
fi xation on the wording of the Constitution.
Indeed, much of Spooner’s overall argument consists of refuta-tions
of what he believes to be blatantly erroneous interpretations
of the law. He breaks down the language of each supposed pro-slavery
provision of the Constitution in order to show how their
meanings have been distorted. However, like Douglass, Spooner’s
narrow focus on detail results in rather far-fetched claims. For in-stance,
he addresses Article 1, Section 2, or the “three-fi fths clause,”
which states:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States, which may be included within this Union, ac-cording
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fi fths [3/5] of all other persons.20
Regarding this controversial clause, Spooner explains, “The slave
argument assumes, gratuitously, that the word ‘free’ is used as the
correlative of slavery, and thence it infers that the words ‘all other
persons,’ mean slaves.” He argues alternatively, “It is obvious that
the word ‘free’ aff ords no argument for slavery, unless a meaning
correlative with slavery be arbitrarily given to it, for the very pur-pose
of making the constitution sanction or recognize slavery.” Fi-nally,
he adds conclusively, “slavery then had no legal existence. The
word must obviously be presumed to be used as the correlative of
something that did legally exist, rather than of something that did
not legally exist. If it were used as the correlative of something that
did not legally exist, the words ‘all other persons’ would have no
19. Spooner, Lysander. “The Three-Fifths Clause.” The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. 3rd Ed.
(Boston: Bela Marsh, 1860), 79.
20. Ibid., 73.
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
54
legal application.”21 Even more forcefully than Douglass, Spooner
fi xated on the true meaning of the wording of the clause.
Despite his careful reasoning, Spooner completely overlooks
the actual historical reality of the writing of the Constitution. His
fi xation on wording removes the document from its historical con-text—
from the labors of a congregation of men—and lifts it, ironi-cally,
to an impenetrable abstract plane. To discern the true meaning
of any document, one must examine authorial intention. Spooner,
unfortunately, undermines his own argument by ignoring the actual
intentions of the men who so deliberately chose those words.
Spooner insists that “free” does not indirectly express “enslaved,”
yet the discourse throughout the debate over the adoption of the
clause proves otherwise. In plain language, the delegates discussed
the 3/5 law as referring to “slaves,” sometimes even calling them
“blacks.” In one instance, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts report-edly
“thought property not the rule of representation.” He asked
rather brusquely, “Why then should the blacks, who were property
in the South, be in the rule of representation more than the Cattle
and horses of the North. [sic]”22 James Madison, the Father of the
Constitution himself, was quoted in the records as proposing, “[I]
nstead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches [of
Congress], to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing
the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in one
branch according to the number of free inhabitants only.”23 In these
instances, as in many more, the delegates expressed in cold, clear
language what the euphemistic phrase “all other persons” refers to:
black slaves. While Spooner marshals other arguments worthy of
consideration, his essential reliance on overlooking or else denying
the existence and legitimacy of slavery in the minds of the founders
signifi cantly undermines his overall claim.
The Constitution is, at its most essential level, a compro-mise—
a balancing act that demonstrates the lengths to which early
Americans went to ensure the precarious equilibrium between
state and central government. The delegates at the Constitutional
Convention did not seek to create a Utopia; they sought a func-tional
democracy. The very words of the preamble “form a more
21. Spooner, “The Three-Fifths Clause,” 73-4.
22. Kaminski, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 46.
23. Kaminski, “The Constitutional Convention and Slavery,” 47.
BRENNA MCCALLICK
55
perfect Union” reveal their belief that the nation could not and
would not remain static in its laws and institutions. These words
indicate both the belief that government was inherently imper-fect
and that the Union would never be truly perfect. Slavery was
accounted for in the Constitution not because the founders want-ed
it to exist in the nation for all time, but because it had to be
accepted in the interest of establishing a Union. Douglass is cor-rect
in noting the signifi cance of the omission of “slavery.” The
founders realized the gravity of including the word, and we can
faithfully interpret its omission as their underlying disdain for the
institution. Nevertheless, the Constitution still does include slav-ery,
however vaguely and euphemistically. Ultimately, the framers
instituted laws regarding slavery because they accepted its real-ity.
They left what most believed to be the inevitable process of
emancipation up to posterity.
Works Cited
“The Constitutional Convention and Slavery.” A Necessary Evil? Slavery
and the Debate Over the Constitution. Ed. John P. Kaminski. Madison:
Madison House, 1995.
Douglass, Frederick. “The Dred Scott Decision” 1857. The Frederick
Douglass Papers. Ed. John W. Blassingame. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1979-1992.
________. “The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America”
1863. The Frederick Douglass Papers. Ed. John W. Blassingame. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979-1992.
Garrison, William L. “The United States Constitution.” Selections From
the Writings and Speeches . New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968.
Spooner, Lysander. “The Three-Fifths Clause.” The Unconstitutionality of
Slavery. 3rd Ed. Boston: Bela Marsh, 1860.
THE STORY OF CORMAC MAC AIRT
56
WRITER’S COMMENTS
Nearly everyone studying European history has heard of Robin Hood,
Bloody Mary, or some other once-historical-fi gure-gone-legendary,
and yet few researchers take the time to focus on the reasons why
these persons have become so embroiled in myth and folklore. Instead,
the accounts of their lives are reduced to footnoted examples of
“bad history.” Professor Olds’s Myths and Forgeries in European History
Senior Seminar focused on just such a subject, prompting us to ask
not only what the truths behind these fi gures were, but also why
such mythology had sprung up. “What is History but a Fable Agreed
Upon? The Story of Cormac mac Airt” focuses on a 3rd century Irish
king who, though no doubt a powerful and infl uential king while alive,
has been aggrandized to a super-human warrior and king, much like
England’s King Arthur. This paper explores patriotic Irish literature
of the past millennium, as well as external cultural, military, and
technological forces that shaped Cormac mac Airt’s change from
human king to a sort of supernaturally blessed Irish King Arthur.
—Kelsey Ransick
INSTRUCTOR’S COMMENTS
Beginning with Herodotus, the Greek historian whose detractors
called him “the Father of Lies,” and continuing into the modern period,
differentiating between history and fi ction has been diffi cult. While the
History Channel and other popular outlets would have us believe that the
role of the historian is simply to unveil the naked truth about what ‘really’
happened, students in my seminar learn that the contrast is not always
so clear. While reading many of the foundational writings of European
history, we discover that even purportedly objective historical narratives
must be read critically. In particular, we focus on historical accounts of
origins, ranging from the origins of humanity itself in biblical accounts,
the origins of various European peoples as imagined by medieval
historians, and of the origins of modern nation-states, as crafted by their
current inhabitants. In her exemplary essay, in which she synthesizes her
extensive and careful independent research, Kelsey nimbly dissects the
various strands of history and legend in the narratives of Cormac mac
Airt. In fl awless prose, Kelsey expertly navigates the complex relationship
between the past and its representations, while also illuminating the
ambiguities that muddy the waters between truth and fi ction, and
between a historian and her sources.
—Katrina Olds, Department of History
KELSEY RANSICK
57
KELSEY RANSICK
The Story of Cormac mac Airt
“What is history but a fable agreed upon?” —Napoleon
IRELAND has an abundance of mystical tales, many of which, for
the everyday reader, have come to take the place of verifi able
history for the periods that lack written manuscripts. Though this
is not a calamity, some measures must be taken to explain how and
why the history and myths of Ireland are so intertwined that it is al-most
too diffi cult to separate them. One fi gure that illustrates well
the complexities of Irish myth and history is that of Cormac mac
Airt, a high-king of Tara in the 3rd century. The present-day stories
about the semi-legendary fi gure of Cormac refl ect more of their
infl uences than their origins. While substantial enough to prove his
existence and his lasting infl uence on Irish culture, these stories do
not provide enough consensus for a modern scholar to be satisfi ed
of the details of his reign. The modern concept of Cormac mac
Airt is formed by his place in history as well as in literature, though
the former’s accuracy has been somewhat lost to a lack of primary
sources and further overpowered by England’s growing control over
the rest of the British Isles, and the latter has had many adaptations
made in the struggle to align the Irish story with the literary tradi-tions
of the countries that Ireland came into contact with.
Cormac, the son of Art and grandson of Conn of the Hundred
Battles, is generally “considered greatest [of all Irish kings] by the
poets, the seanachies, and the chroniclers.”1 A seanchaí was similar to
a bard, an “offi cial genealogist and historian [who today is known
as a] teller of tales and singer of songs.”2 It is in these genealogies
and songs that Cormac fi rst appears, and for many centuries, it was
only thanks to the virtue of these seanachies that what is known of
1. Seumas MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race: A Popular History of Ireland (New York: The
Devin-Adair Company, 1946), 45.
2. Francis John Byrne, Irish Kings and High-Kings (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 14.
THE STORY OF CORMAC MAC AIRT
58
the high-king survived. Their accounts are not necessarily primary
sources, but are the closest the modern reader can get to them. Ac-cording
to seanachaí tradition, Cormac’s father died in battle the
night after he was conceived, and, after he was born, some stories
say he was reared by a wolf, much like the she-wolf in the stories of
Romulus and Remus.3 Others say that a foster father named Luigne
Fer Trí raised him.4 Still others say that he was brought up in the
court of the King of Ulster.5 There are two main stories about how
he became king. The fi rst assumes that he was raised at the King of
Ulster’s court. After he is expelled from court for varying reasons,
he forms a plan to take revenge upon the king. He makes an alli-ance
with the warrior Tadg and promises him “as much land as he
could compass in his chariot the evening after the battle in which
he should be victorious.” 6 The two defeat the king and Cormac
takes his throne. The other version claims that as a child, Cormac
was a shepherd for a widow in the lands of Lugaid Mac Conn, who
was the usurper of the throne that rightfully belonged to Cormac.
One of the widow’s sheep escapes and eats from the queen’s garden,
and Lugaid pronounces that the sheep must be killed. As that would
deprive the widow of her source of income, Cormac denounces Lu-gaid’s
judgment as unjust, pointing out that the profi ts of the sheep’s
wool ought to pay back the price of the vegetables, as both the wool
and the vegetables will grow again. The people realize that Cormac’s
fi nding is “a true judgment . . . and he who makes it must surely be
the son of a king.”7 Lugaid fl ees and Cormac becomes king.
After these rather fantastical stories of Cormac’s youth, we fi nd
much more substantial evidence about Cormac’s reign. We know
more of his accomplishments as an adult because, as a king, he
was better known, and he left written records through which we
can trace his actions. Many things were expected of a high king of
Ireland, and Cormac accomplished much for his people. He was
3. Ibid., 66.
4. Anne Connon, “A Prosopography of the Early Queens of Tara,” The Kingship and Landscape
of Tara, ed. Edel Bhreathnach (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005), 234.
5. Alfred Webb, A Compendium of Irish Biography (Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1878), 96.
6. Ibid., 96.
7. Helen Landreth, Dear Dark Head: An Intimate Story of Ireland (London: Wittlesey House,
1936), 52.
KELSEY RANSICK
59
especially concerned with the laws of Ireland, codifying the laws
that “remained basic Irish law until the seventeenth century.”8 He
established the Fort of Kings at Tara as the seat of the high kings9
of Ireland to help enforce his law codes, and he founded universi-ties
for war, history, and jurisprudence.10 The Fianna, “a great stand-ing
army of picked and specially trained, daring warriors, whose
duty was to carry out the mandates of the high king,”11 reached
the height of their power and success under Cormac and Finn mac
Cumaill, who was married to the high-king’s daughter.12 After or-ganizing
much of Ireland under his high-kingship, Cormac turned
his attention to expansion. He “obtained…the sovereignty of Alba,”
which is modern-day Scotland.13 He brought in new technologies,
such as the watermill he brought in for his Pictish mistress and
quern-maid, Ciarnat.14 By the end of his reign, Cormac had au-thored
three books. One was the Doomsday Book-like Psalter of
Tara; another was the Book of Aicill, a book on criminal law; and the
last was The Counsels of Cormac or Instructions of a King, a book of ad-vice
for his son and other rulers.15 When Cormac fi nally retired in
the mid-3rd century (either because his son came of age or because
he lost and eye and he had to act “in compliance with a law which
required that the king should have no personal blemish”),16 it was
said that “thus end[ed] one of the most fruitful as well as illustrious
reigns that ever blessed the island.”17 Though it is diffi cult to pin
down the exact year of his death, most place it around 266 A.D.
Because of his request to not be buried in the traditional pagan
graveyard of the kings of Tara, many believe that Cormac was one
of the fi rst three Christians in Ireland before the coming of St.
Patrick.18 Additionally, many legends say that the druid Mailgenn,
8. Max Caulfi eld, The Irish Mystique (Englewood Cliff s: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 107.
9. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 47.
10. Martin Haverty, History of Ireland (San Francisco: Occidental Publishing Co., 1881). 41.
11. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 65.
12. Connon, The Kingship and Landscape of Tara, 247.
13. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 48.
14. Donnchadh Ó Corráin, “Ireland c.800: Aspects of Society,” in A New History of Ireland, ed.
Dáibhí Ó Crónín (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 564.
15. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 50-51.
16. Haverty, History of Ireland, 42.
17. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race:, 50.
18. R. A. S. Macalister, Ancient Ireland: A Study in the Lessons of Archaeology and History (London:
THE STORY OF CORMAC MAC AIRT
60
angered by Cormac’s conversion, cursed the king to choke to death
on a salmon bone.19
The two ways to best evaluate these legends are to look at Cor-mac
mac Airt as two diff erent yet related persons. It is tempting
to believe that “with ‘deifi cation’, such characters [as Cormac] are
removed from the historical scene,”20 but one must understand
Cormac as both an historical and a literary fi gure, for he has sig-nifi
cance in both traditions. As far as the former Cormac, most of
our gleanings come from archaeological evidence, foreign writings
on contemporary Ireland, and a few primary sources. The three
books that Cormac is supposed to have written are some of the
only sources we have from his time, though parts of them were
clearly edited and adapted by later authors. Thus, most research on
Cormac relies heavily upon secondary sources. For the most part,
the sources agree on Cormac’s historical importance. They address
how later vestiges of his infl uence provide reasonable evidence that
he was a real person. Remnants of his standing army, the Fianna,
continued for a few centuries after his death and made a resurgence
in the 19th century as Ireland made its fi nal and somewhat success-ful
push towards independence. The Fenians were an important
symbol for the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and their American
counterpart, the Fenian Brotherhood, stood for a politically and
socially independent Ireland.21 As later Irish sources boast and as
the Venerable Bede confi rms, Cormac gained control over Alba/
Scotland and parts of Wales.22
Two of the three books that are attributed to Cormac survive
to this day in various forms. The Psalter of Tara, whose existence
is known through its references in other works, is now lost. Some
believe the Psalter of Tara to be a record of land ownership and divi-sion,
while others believe it to be records of genealogies, battles,
and antiquities. As no copies remain, its subject is unclear. The Ber-la
Laws, also known as the Book of Aicill, were a fundamental part of
Methuen & Co., 1935), 161.
19. Helen Landreth, Dear Dark Head: An Intimate Story of Ireland (London: Wittlesey House,
1936), 61.
20. James Carney, “Language and Literature to 1169,” in A New History of Ireland, ed. Dáibhí Ó
Crónín (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 480.
21. Landreth, “The Ragged Coat,” in Dear Dark Head, 259-296.
22. Caulfi eld, The Irish Mystique, 107.
KELSEY RANSICK
61
Irish law until the time of Elizabeth I. Their basic framework
remains, but there is little doubt that these were edited and
adapted by later rulers. Cormac wrote the original fourteen
articles of the laws to guide his son, Coirpri, who succeeded
him, and law schools soon picked up on his text, producing
additional commentary and laws.23 An unknown lawyer in the
8th century compiled the fi nal form of the Berla Laws that is
available today.24 Though expanded by later lawmakers, the
laws Cormac put together “governed the people of Ireland till
Elizabeth [Tudor’s] English laws supplanted them.”25 If noth-ing
else, this feat alone should settle Cormac in the history
books as one of the most infl uential inhabitants of Ireland.
Interestingly, some of the laws Cormac wrote “defi ne[d] the
rights and duties of foreign trading vessels.”26 That he found it
necessary to draw up these rights and duties indicates extensive
trading relations with other countries. In fact, he is believed to
have had “a diverse group of clients from among the Gauls,
Romans, Franks, Frisians, Lombards, Caledonians, Saxons, and
Cruthin.”27 The Instructions of a King is the most well known
of his works, and we have many translations of it today. It is
one of the only primary sources on Cormac available to mod-ern
scholars. Because of its detailed dialogue on good qualities
for kings, the authority of kings and chieftains, agriculture and
animal husbandry, warnings, health, and justice, we get a pretty
good idea of the general opinion on these subjects during Cor-mac’s
time, and therefore many aspects of everyday life—both
the ideal and the imperfect—are explained.
Unfortunately, we do not have many documents from Ire-land
during Cormac’s reign, which means we must rely on ar-chaeology
for more information on 3rd century Ireland. Archae-ological
evidence presents the following picture of 3rd century
Ireland:
23. M. J. Macauliff e, Gaelic Law: The Berla Laws; Or, The Ancient Irish Common Laws (Dub-lin:
Hodges, Figgis, and Co., 1925), 7.
24. Ibid.
25. Landreth, Dear Dark Head, 56.
26. MacManus, The Story of the Irish Race, 85.
27. Thomas Cleary, trans., The Counsels of Cormac (New York: Doubleday, 2004), viii-ix.
THE STORY OF CORMAC MAC AIRT
62
With favorable climatic conditions, from c.200 onwards …
the pollen evidence indicates increasing woodland clearance
and a major expansion in both pastoral farming and tillage.
This suggests a rising population. This is likely to have been
the result of a better diet indicative of farming improve-ments,
probably coming from Roman Britain, which may
have included the introduction of dairying, new types of do-mestic
animal, new crop strains, and new technology.28
This trend helps explain why Cormac was regarded as such an
excellent king, as “the Irish idea of kingship [was defi ned by]
good trade, good weather, good omens, [and] such abundance
of goodwill that nobody slew another.”29 The increase in food
production and rising population that became apparent dur-ing
Cormac’s reign meant he was credited with creating such
prosperity. One can see the remnants of the new religion and
technology spreading from the Roman Empire that Cormac
brought to Ireland that made its appearance during or soon af-ter
his time. It is also clear that he erected many buildings at
Tara, including the banqueting hall, a sun-house for the queen,
the Kings’ Seat, and the House of Cormac.30 The remains at
Tara are still visited by millions of tourists each year. The Annals
of Ulster used Cormac’s death was for dating other events, such
as the Battle of Ochae. By the 5th century, Niall Noígiallach,
another high-king, was claiming Cormac as his ancestor in an
attempt to legitimize his reign, though the implication that the
kingship was “direct succession from father to son…is quite out
of keeping with the Irish laws of dynastic succession and betrays
the prehistoric regnal list as merely a converted pedigree.”31
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the primary sourc-es,
“for the age in which they were written, the legends of Cor-mac
mac Airt are important primary documents,”32 indicating
that literature surrounding Cormac reveals much about the
28. Nancy Edwards, “The Archaeology of Early Medieval Ireland,” in A New History of
Ireland, ed. Dáibhí Ó Crónín (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 296.
29. Carney, A New History of Ireland, 484.
30. R. A. S. Macalister, “The Site of Tara,” in Tara: A Pagan Sanctuary of Ancient Ireland
(London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931), 1-81.
31. Byrne, Irish Kings and High-Kings, 73.
32. Tomás Ó Cathasaigh, The Heroic Biography of Cormac mac Airt (Dublin: Dublin Insti-tute
for Advanced Studies, 1977), 26.
KELSEY RANSICK
63
diff erent times when the legend was written down by the manner
in which it was written. A thorough reading of the legends will
show that the literary fi gure of Cormac served to “exemplify ide-al
kingship than portray [the] actual king.”33 His stories are valu-able
because they refl ect the “deep-lying concepts of ancient Irish
kingship.”34 The fi rst mark of this theme is Cormac’s fi r fl athemon—
his judgment on the widow’s sheep who ate the queen’s vegetables.
The fi r fl athemon, meaning “‘the prince’s truth’, is central to the
Irish ideology of kingship.”35 It was through the king’s demonstra-tions
of righteousness and justice that “come prosperity and fertil-ity
for man, beast and crops; the seasons are temperate, the corn
grows strong and heavy…cattle give milk in plenty, [and] rivers and
estuaries teem with fi sh.”36 This pervading prosperity in turn indi-cates
the theme so prevalent in “Irish literature of kingship: the
king is the centre of the cosmos.”37 Because we are still able to per-ceive
such a markedly Irish concept in his legend, the sources that
discuss his fi r fl atheman and other marks of the ideal Irish king are
distinct from later literary tracts that show the infl uence of other
cultures the Irish encountered after Cormac’s time.
Though this theme pervades the literature of Ireland across
many centuries, the historical reality of kingship in 3rd century
Ireland was perhaps much less extravagant. There were two “lev-els”
of king in ancient Ireland: the local king and the high king.
The high king was one of dozens of loca